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Abstract 
This paper provides a comprehensive review of the factors that can 
cause price levels to diverge and which are at the root of different 
inflation rates in Europe including the EU-27. Among others, we study 
the structural and cyclical factors influencing market and non-market-
based service, house and goods prices, and we summarise some 
stylised facts emerging from descriptive statistics. Subsequently, we 
set out the possible mismatches between price level convergence and 
inflation rates. Having described in detail the underlying economic 
factors, we proceed to demonstrate the relative importance of these 
factors on observed inflation rates first in an accounting framework 
and then by relying on panel estimations. Our estimation results 
provide the obituary notice for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
Nevertheless, we show that other factors related to economic 
convergence may push up inflation rates in transition economies. 
Cyclical effects and regulated prices are found to be important drivers 
of inflation rates in an enlarged Europe. House prices matter to some 
extent in the euro area, whereas the exchange rate plays a prominent 
(but declining) role in transition economies. 
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1. Introduction 
In a monetary union, the level of price dispersion and if it is high, whether it tends to decrease (see e.g. 
Rogers, 2001, 2002 and Engel and Rogers, 2004), is of great importance. In this context, the question 
of what the structural and cyclical factors behind different inflation rates are arises. Lane and Honohen 
(2004) showed recently that besides non-euro area openness and the output gap, price level 
convergence did effect the inflation differential for the euro area from 1999 to 2001.
1 Rogers (2001, 
2002) points out using the EIU CityData that factors related to price level convergence play no role in 
inflation differentials, while factors such as GDP growth, non-euro-area openness and oil prices are 
important determinants of inflation differentials. 
The driving forces of price level convergence and the causes of inflation differentials in the new EU 
member states of Central and Eastern Europe recently attracted much attention both in academic and 
policy circles. The reason for this is that these countries are obliged to adopt the euro at some point in 
the future. Hence, the question arises whether the lower initial price levels and the ongoing catching-
up process will lead to substantially higher inflation rates in the longer run by increasing inflation 
dispersion within the euro area. 
While different aspects of price level convergence and inflation differentials have already been studied 
for the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, no study to our knowledge has tried thus 
far to summarise comprehensively all the relevant aspects relating to both price level convergence and 
inflation differentials.
2 With this as a background, this study has a twofold objective. First, we discuss 
the possible causes of different price levels and inflation differentials between the old and the new EU 
member states (and acceding and candidate countries), and provide ample empirical data to underpin 
the functioning of each factor. We also outline possible mismatches between price level convergence 
and inflation rates. Second, we use a simple accounting framework and panel estimates to disentangle 
the relative importance of the different factors on observed inflation rates in Europe. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some stylised facts about price 
levels and inflation rates in Europe. Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 deal with the prices of market-based 
services, non-market based services and goods, house prices and the prices of goods, respectively. 
Section 7 sketches out the importance of external factors and similarities in economic structures. 
Section 8 aims to explain the possible mismatch between price level convergence and inflation rates. 
Subsequently, section 9 assesses the relative importance of the different structural and cyclical factors 
on the observed inflation rates drawing first on a simple accounting framework and then using the 
results of panel estimates. Finally, Section 10 summarises the main findings of the paper. 
 
2. Price Levels and Inflation Rates: Some Stylised Facts 
Let us start by reviewing the main stylised facts pertaining to relative price levels. The absolute price 
level of countries hat are less developed in terms of GDP per capita seems to be well below the euro 
area average (see Table 1). This observation holds true for the transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe, whose price levels range from 40 percent (Bulgaria) to 70 percent (Slovenia) of the 
euro area average. It also holds true for the cohesion countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain). However, 
a significant reduction in these differences was observed for most of these countries from the mid-
1990s up to the present, perhaps with the exception of Slovenia (which displays more moderate 
differences than the other Central and Eastern European countries). At the same time, as a result of 
successful disinflation during the last 10 years or so, high inflation rates were brought down during to 
late 1990s to low one-digit inflation rates by 2006. For instance, inflation rates are very close to euro 
                                                 
1 See also ECB(2003a) for a discussion on the potential causes of inflation differentials in the euro area. 
2 Backé et al. (2002) analysed inflation dynamics in market-based and non-market based services. Cihák and Holub (2001, 
2003 and 2005) looked at relative price adjustments using data from the international price comparison programme. Égert, 
Halpern and MacDonald (2006) surveyed the literature on the changes in (but not the level of) real exchange rates (the 
reciprocal of the relative price levels) in transition economies but did not address the sources of domestic inflation. Égert, 
Ritzberger-Grünwald and Silgoner (2004) provided an overview on the main factors driving inflation rates in Europe. 
Hammermann (2007) used panel data to understand the non-monetary determinants of inflation in Romania.   3
area inflation rates in the Czech Republic and Poland. This is a first indication that lower initial price 
levels and real catching-up do not necessarily imply higher inflation rates. 
According to the conventional view, the price level in less developed economies is lower than in more 
developed countries because of the lower price level of services. The prices of goods should be 
comparable across countries if the absolute version of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is at work. This 
is something that can be indeed observed in the data (see Table 1), as price levels for both aggregate 
and consumer services are significantly lower in the new member states than in the old. This is 
particularly true of Bulgaria and Romania. 
Nevertheless, lower market service prices are only one side of the coin, given that the other 
components of the price level are also substantially lower in the new EU member states of Central and 
Eastern Europe than in the euro area. For instance, the relative price level of non-market services 
(government and collective services) is very low in the transition economies compared with the euro 
area average. A similar pattern emerges for Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
The PPP and equal prices for goods seem to be a fair assumption for the euro area, where the prices of 
durable and semi-durable goods turn out to be rather similar (Table 1). However, goods prices are 
lower in the cohesion countries than in the euro area by 10 to 20 percent, and they reach only between 
60 percent and 90 percent of the euro area price in the CEE-8
3. The price level of goods is even lower 
in Bulgaria and Romania than in the CEE-8. This ranking is in line with the ordering of the countries 
in terms of GDP per capita.
4 This suggests that there is a relationship between the price level of goods 
and the level of economic development and that product market competition is not a sufficient 
condition to bring about price level convergence for goods while large differences in wages exist 
across countries for a number of reasons. We develop these in more detail in the following sections. 
In the remainder of the paper, we will spell out the main factors that contribute to lower market and 
non-market service prices, and to lower goods price levels in the new member states. 
                                                 
3 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
4 Rogers (2002) observed in the EIU CityData that the price level of tradables is very low in Central and Eastern Europe as 
compared to the EU-15, without providing any explanation for possible causes of this observation.   4
Table 1. Relative GDP per Capita, Inflation and Relative Price Levels in Europe 
 
 Relative Inflation  Relative price levels (euro area=1) 
  GDP per  HICP  Overall  Services prices  Goods prices 
 Capita    Price  level  Total Consump-
tion 
Gov’t
cons 
Collective
cons 
Individual
cons  Total  Non 
durable 
Semi 
durable Durable
 ´96  ´05  ´97-´05  ´05  ´95  ´05  ´04  ´04  ´04  ´04  ´04  ´04  ´04  ´04  ´04 
Euro 
area  1.00  1.00  1.9%  2.1%  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 
AT  1.16  1.15  1.5%  2.1%  1.10  1.01  1.02 0.99 1.07 1.02  1.11 1.02  1.02 1.08 1.01 
BE  1.08  1.11  1.8%  2.6%  1.07  1.01  1.04 1.03 1.05 1.04  1.06 0.99  0.98 1.04 1.01 
DE  1.08  1.03  1.4%  1.9%  1.19  1.03  1.13 1.08 1.20 1.14  1.26 1.02  0.98 1.02 1.03 
ES  0.80  0.93  2.8%  3.4%  0.80  0.88  0.81 0.84 0.80 0.81  0.79 0.91  0.98 0.97 0.81 
FI  0.95  1.07  1.5%  0.8%  1.13  1.10  1.19 1.26 1.11 1.08  1.14 1.03  1.16 1.07 1.16 
FR  1.03  1.02  1.6%  1.9%  1.07  1.04  1.02 1.11 0.94 0.99  0.90 1.06  0.98 0.95 1.03 
GR  0.64  0.77  3.6%  3.5%  0.72  0.83  0.73 0.79 0.67 0.72  0.63 0.87  0.97 0.96 0.83 
IE  0.93  1.29  3.1%  2.1%  0.87  1.18  1.19 1.23 1.15 1.13  1.16 1.19  1.12 0.98 1.23 
IT  1.06  0.97  2.3%  2.2%  0.78  0.98  0.96 0.94 1.00 0.99  1.02 0.98  1.04 1.05 1.08 
NL  1.09  1.17  2.5%  1.5%  1.05  1.04  1.03 1.05 1.01 1.05  0.99 1.06  1.05 0.92 1.02 
PT  0.69  0.67  2.8%  2.1%  0.69  0.82  0.77 0.76 0.79 0.74  0.83 0.85  1.05 0.89 0.90 
DK  1.13  1.17  1.9%  1.7%  1.30  1.29  1.35 1.35 1.35 1.32  1.36 1.26  1.41 1.15 1.35 
SE  1.06  1.08  1.5%  0.8%  1.12  1.16  1.17 1.21 1.12 1.09  1.14 1.16  1.09 1.13 1.19 
UK  1.00  1.10  1.4%  2.0%  0.83  1.06  1.04 1.02 1.08 1.03  1.11 1.07  1.06 0.96 1.09 
CY  0.73  0.78  2.7%  2.0%  0.80  0.88  0.83 0.82 0.87 0.83  0.92 0.91  1.09 0.98 0.99 
MT  0.71*  0.65  2.8%  2.6%  0.64*  0.67  0.56 0.60 0.53 0.52  0.54 0.79  1.11 0.85 0.83 
CZ  0.65  0.69  3.7%  1.6%  0.36  0.55  0.39 0.40 0.38 0.42  0.36 0.67  0.83 0.88 0.63 
EE  0.32  0.54  4.8%  4.2%  0.36  0.57  0.43 0.54 0.34 0.37  0.31 0.73  0.82 0.85 0.65 
HU  0.44  0.57  9.1%  3.5%  0.41  0.60  0.44 0.48 0.41 0.46  0.38 0.74  0.84 0.84 0.69 
LT  0.32  0.49  2.5%  2.7%  0.24  0.48  0.33 0.41 0.27 0.31  0.24 0.66  0.80 0.80 0.59 
LV  0.28  0.44  4.2%  7.0%  0.31  0.49  0.37 0.46 0.29 0.32  0.26 0.65  0.83 0.80 0.59 
PL  0.39  0.47  6.4%  2.1%  0.41  0.53  0.36 0.42 0.31 0.34  0.29 0.60  0.76 0.69 0.58 
SI  0.63  0.75  6.6%  2.5%  0.69  0.71  0.65 0.66 0.65 0.69  0.63 0.78  0.86 0.91 0.80 
SK  0.42  0.52  7.2%  2.8%  0.38  0.54  0.35 0.39 0.32 0.36  0.29 0.71  0.85 0.80 0.66 
BG  0.25  0.30  7.3%  5.0%  0.23  0.36  0.24 0.31 0.18 0.20  0.17 0.56  0.73 0.57 0.55 
RO  0.23*  0.33  44.4%  9.1%  0.33  0.44  0.27 0.34 0.20 0.22  0.19 0.52  0.74 0.55 0.47 
HR  0.36 0.46  n.a.  n.a.  0.51 0.59  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
TR  0.28  0.29  47.6%  8.1%  0.43  0.55  0.38 0.41 0.34 0.36  0.32 0.66  0.93 0.69 0.70 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data drawn from NewCronos/Eurostat 
Note: GDP per capita figures are relative to the euro area average. GDP per capita figures converted using the PPP 
conversion rate vis-à-vis the euro area. Inflation rates are harmonised average annual inflation rates published by Eurostat. 
The relative price level is based on GDP price levels. Note that data based on final consumption looks very similar. The 
relative price level of services and goods are based on ESA95 aggregates. Total stands for the overall price level of services 
and goods. Consumption, gov’t cons, collective cons and individual cons indicate the relative price level of consumer, 
government, collective and individual services. AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, DE=Germany, ES=Spain, FI=Finland, 
FR=France, GR=Greece, IE=Ireland, IT=Italy, NL=Netherlands, PT=Portugal, DK=Denmark, SE=Sweden, UK=United 
Kingdom, CY=Cyprus, MT=Malta, CZ=Czech Republic, EE=Estonia, HU=Hungary, LT=Lithuania, LV=Latvia, PL=Poland, 
SI=Slovenia, SK=Slovakia, BG=Bulgaria, RO=Romania, HR=Croatia, TR=Turkey 
* indicates that the data refer to 1999 and not to 1996 for Malta and Romania. 
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3. The Prices of Market-Based Services 
3.1. The Usual Suspect: Balassa-Samuelson from the Supply Side 
3.1.1.. The Level Effect 
The well-known proposition put forth by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) is widely used in the 
economic profession to explain cheaper services in less developed countries. Let us recall briefly their 
argument. It is assumed that an economy is split into two sectors, producing tradable and non-tradable 
goods and that market forces are at work in both sectors. This has important implications, because in 
the public and other regulated sectors, wages and prices will not behave as they would in market-based 
sectors (see next section for more discussion on price regulation). One of the key assumptions is that 
PPP holds for the tradable sector, i.e. prices in the domestic and foreign economies are the same once 
they are converted to the same currency unit. Another important assumption is that wages are linked to 
the level of productivity in the open sector and that wages tend to equalise across sectors so that the 
wage level in the closed sector equals that in the open sector. 
Let us assume that the home country is a developing country with low productivity levels in the open 
sector. Given that tradable prices are given by PPP, low productivity in the open sector implies low 
wages in the same sector.
5 This in turn means low wages and low prices in the market-based closed 
sector. Given that the actual nominal exchange rate is determined by PPP in the open sector, the prices 
of non-tradable goods, expressed in the same currency, will cost less in the home country than in the 
foreign country. As a result of lower non-tradable prices, the overall price level in the home country 
will be below that of the foreign country. 
3.1.2. The Dynamic Effect 
If productivity improves faster in the open sector than in the market-based sheltered sector, market-
determined non-tradable prices are expected to rise because of the wage spill-over from tradables to 
non-tradables. This in turn gives rise to an increase in the overall price level. If the home country's 
productivity differential between the open and the market-based sheltered sector exceeds that of the 
foreign country, the price level will rise faster in the home country because of a positive inflation 
differential.
6 
The relationship between productivity growth and non-tradable inflation can be derived formally 
based on a two-sector neoclassical framework with perfect capital mobility and with the interest rate 
being exogenous:  
NT T T NT a a p p ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ − = −
γ
δ
        ( 1 )  
where small letters indicate log-transformed variables, circumflexes (^) denote growth rates, δ and 
γ denote the share of labour in the sheltered and open sectors, respectively. 
T NT p p ˆ ˆ −  represents the 
growth rate of the relative price of non-tradable goods and 
NT T a a ˆ ˆ −  is the growth rate of dual total 
factor productivity. 
                                                 
5 Low productivity means that fewer goods can be produced using the same amount of inputs, i.e. labour and capital, so that 
the inputs’ remuneration should be low (i.e. lower wages) without putting competitiveness at risk (as prices are determined 
by PPP). 
6 This framework assumes that each country produces and exports tradable goods. In parallel, one could argue that a country 
could also export its people. In such a case, a decrease in labour supply would lead to an increase in wages, which would 
imply a rise in the relative prices of non-tradable goods. While the tradable sector may suffer from competitiveness losses, 
remittances may compensate for higher trade deficits. (I thank Jakob von Weizsäcker for pointing this out). Nevertheless, 
while exporting people is probably viable in the medium term, it is more difficult to think of this option as a solid basis for 
sustainable catching-up (as opposed to the productivity driven B-S effect) because remittances usually do not help 
restructuring and upgrading the production capacities of a given country, and because inflows due to remittances may dry out 
if “exported” people stay and integrate in the recipient countries (second and third generations).   6
However, it is also possible to derive a relationship for the level of average labour productivity (as 
opposed to growth rates of total factor productivity) exploiting a well-known feature of Cobb-Douglas 
production functions that marginal productivity equals average productivity, which yields:
7  
NT NT
T T
T
NT
L Y
L Y
P
P
⋅ =
δ
γ
         ( 2 a )  
where Y and L denote output and labour and  L Y  is the average labour productivity. Transforming 
equation (2a) into logarithms leads to: 
) (
NT T T NT prod prod const p p − + = −       ( 2 b )  
where  const  is a constant term containing  ) log(γ  and  ) log(δ  and  prod  is average labour 
productivity. 
3.2. The Role of Factor Endowments 
In an attempt to provide an alternative explanation to the observation that service prices are lower in 
poorer countries than in more developed economies, Bhagwati (1984) argues that the primary reason 
for lower service prices in poorer countries is closely related to lower capital-labour ratios in those 
countries. It can be shown in a general equilibrium framework that countries with lower capital-labour 
ratios will specialise in labour intensive production while countries with higher capital-labour ratios 
will produce capital-intensive goods. The wage level in the open sector is lower in the poorer country 
because lower capital-labour ratios imply lower labour productivity levels. The consequence of this is 
the lower wage level and the ensuing lower price level in the services sector. This framework implies 
that capital deepening, i.e. a rise in the capital-labour ratio of the open sector, and a shift towards the 
production of more capital-intensive goods, leads to an increase in the relative price of non-tradables. 
3.3. Demand-Side Explanations 
Yet another extension of the traditional Balassa-Samuelson framework is the inclusion of demand side 
factors. In this spirit, Bergstrand (1991) shows that the relative price of non-tradables depends not only 
on relative productivity and on the capital-labour ratio, but is also crucially influenced by demand-side 
factors. In a general equilibrium framework, the demand for, and supply of, non-tradable goods 
relative to tradable goods can be solved for the relative price of non-tradables: 
y ˆ k ˆ ) a ˆ a ˆ ( p ˆ p ˆ
NT T T NT
3 2 1 ⋅ + ⋅ + − ⋅ = − φ φ φ       ( 3 )  
where  k ˆ  and  y ˆ  are changes in the capital-labour ratio and in per capita income, respectively. GDP 
per capita could well capture demand-side pressures linked to government and private consumption. 
An increase in GDP per capita levels, implying higher private consumption, may result in a rise in the 
demand for non-tradable goods because of the high income elasticity of demand for non-tradable 
goods. The wealthier that households are, the higher the proportion of non-tradables in their 
consumption basket will be.  
Fischer (2004) demonstrates in a three-sector four-input model, as opposed to the two-sector, two-
input standard Balassa-Samuelson model, that there is a positive relationship between investment 
demand and the relative price of non-tradable goods. 
3.4. Empirical Validation 
In this section, we seek to analyse the empirical evidence regarding the above-developed explanations 
for non-tradable price inflation. We limit ourselves to the study of the inflation rates implied by the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect and look at final household consumption in order to disentangle possible 
demand-side effects. But we leave aside the issue of capital deepening because of the lack of 
comparable data. 
3.4.1. Methodological Notes 
Starting with the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect, three approaches are used in the empirical literature 
to derive the size of the inflation rate imputable to productivity gains. The simplest approach relies on 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Égert, Halpern and MacDonald (2006) for more details.   7
a simple accounting framework (see e.g. Kovács, 2002). This assumes that the impact of market non-
tradable inflation in excess of tradable inflation is determined by the share of market non-tradables in 
the inflation basket, so that  ) p - p α)( (1 p
T NT ∆ ∆ − = ∆  with ( α 1− ) being the share of non-tradables, 
and that, importantly, any change in the growth of the productivity differential will cause a 
proportionate change in the relative price of non-tradables ( ) prod - (prod p - p
NT T T NT β =  with 
1 = β ). Hence, the inflation rate attributable to productivity gains (
S - B p ) can be written as the share 
of market non-tradable goods in the CPI basket ( α 1− ) multiplied by the growth rate of the 
productivity differential: 
) α)( (1 p
NT T S - B prod prod ∆ − ∆ − = ∆        ( 4 )  
 
Where  ∆ denotes average annual changes. The approach what we may call the hybrid approach uses 
the coefficient estimate linking the relative price of market non-tradables and productivity (β ), and 
applies it to the accounting framework in the following way (see e.g. Égert et al. 2003): 
) prod ( α) (1 p
NT T S - B prod ∆ − ∆ − = ∆ β       ( 5 )  
Note that the hybrid approach collapses to the accounting framework if 1 = β .  
Finally, the third approach consists of estimating models for the inflation differential of the following 
form (see e.g. Wagner and Hlouskova (2004) for equation (6a) and Mihaljek and Klau (2004) for 
equation (6b)):
8 
*)) * ( ) (( *) ( * 1
NT T NT T T T prod prod prod prod p p p p ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + = ∆ − ∆ β δ χ  
          ( 6 a )  
*)) * ( ) (( *
NT T NT T prod prod prod prod e p p ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − ∆ β δ χ  (6b) 
where e is the nominal exchange rate. In such a setup, the inflation differential (and not the domestic 
inflation rate) implied by productivity growth is obtained by applying β  to annual growth rates of the 
productivity differential:  
*)) * ( ) (( *
NT T NT T S B prod prod prod prod p p ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ = ∆ − ∆
− β    (7) 
3.4.2. An Update 
General Findings of the Literature 
Numerous studies have estimated the size of the B-S effect both for transition countries and old EU 
member states. A first strand of argument, based on data for the 1990s, holds that the B-S effect had a 
sizeable impact on inflation rates in Central and Eastern Europe. More recent research emphasised, 
however, that the impact on the inflation rate is now considerably lower and lies between zero percent 
and two percent annually in those countries (for an overview on the implied inflation differential vis-à-
vis the euro area, see e.g. Égert, Halpern and MacDonald, 2006). Generally, the results obtained on the 
basis of the simple accounting framework and the hybrid model on the one hand, and those derived 
using the first-differenced inflation differential models (equations (6a) and (6b)) yield fairly similar 
results if they are rendered comparable (results transformed into inflation rates or into inflation 
differentials). The reason for this is that both  α 1−  or  β α) (1−  obtained in the simple accounting 
framework or in the hybrid model, and theβ  obtained in equations (6a) and (6b) are similar in 
magnitude, namely usually around or below 0.3. 
The results for the old member states have two remarkable features (). First, the magnitude of the B-S 
effect is not very different from the size obtained for transition economies. Second, the cohesion 
countries, like Greece, Portugal and Spain do not exhibit substantially larger B-S effects than the core 
of the euro area.  
This literature has the caveat that the results mostly refer to the 1980s and early 1990s for the old EU 
member states, and cover the period up to 2001 or 2002 for the transition economies. For this reason, 
                                                 
8 Wagner and Hlouskova (2004) argue that it is necessary to estimate these models in first differences because of the lack of 
cointegrating relationships for the level variables.   8
updating the results for both groups of countries would appear a worthwhile exercise. We do this, 
relying on the simple accounting framework. 
The Estimated Size of the Balassa-Samuelson Effect 
The first stage of our approach is to calculate average yearly growth rates of labour productivity for 
the tradable and non-tradable goods sectors using annual data from 1995 to 2005.
9 We face two 
problems at this stage, namely price regulatedness and tradability. Indeed, sectors in which prices are 
not governed by market forces should be omitted, because prices would not react to productivity 
changes in the way they would in a sector driven by market forces. Furthermore, even measuring 
productivity is a huge problem in the public sector. In public administration, value added is captured 
by the wage mass. As a result, any increase or decrease in wages is automatically reflected in 
productivity gains or losses all things being equal. 
It has been shown in the literature that these problems matter for the size of the productivity 
differential. Regarding tradability, we use manufacturing as the open sector.
10 Sectors with price 
regulatedness such as agriculture, energy and water supply and public administrations are excluded 
from our analysis. Consequently, our definition of the sheltered sector comprises construction and 
market services. 
Before calculating the imputed B-S effect in accordance with equation (4), we need to quantify the 
share of market services in the HICP. Generally speaking, services account for around 40 percent of 
the HICP in the old member states, and range from 20 percent to 30 percent in the transition 
economies in 2006 (Table 2). 
Let us now turn to the magnitude of the B-S effect reported in Table 2. As a matter of fact, our results 
broadly confirm the two major results of the literature. First, the cohesion countries do not exhibit 
higher B-S effects than the rest of the old EU countries. Indeed, our results indicate that Greece, 
Portugal and Spain have a B-S effect of as little as 0.5 percent per year, while other counties exhibit 
rates close to 1.5 percent.  
Second, the B-S effect is fairly comparable across old and new EU member states. For instance, 
Austria, Finland and Sweden exhibit more similar inflation rates to those implied by the B-S effect 
than the transition economies.  
Third, productivity growth has accelerated recently in the transition economies and so has the implied 
B-S effect. Earlier results showed that Hungary and Poland were the two countries having B-S rates 
above 1.5 percent a year. According to the updates, the three Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Slovenia have now joined the privileged club, with yearly inflation rates due to the B-S 
effect doubling in those countries compared to earlier results. However, a note of caution should be 
sounded regarding the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia because of the large error margin 
coming from imprecise statistics. It is also worth noting that our updates provide a fair approximation 
for the results obtained using equations (6a) and (6b) for the reasons explained earlier. 
The Balassa-Samuelson Effect: Upper-Bound Estimates 
While these results are consistent with equations (5) and (7) for the reasons explained earlier, these 
results can be viewed as upper bound estimates. First of all, the share of market services as of 2006 is 
used for these calculations, and these shares were lower in the past.
11 Second, the simple accounting 
framework posits a proportional relationship between dual productivity and the relative price of 
                                                 
9 The selection of this period is motivated by the fact that one has to be cautious in using productivity data from the early 
1990s for transition economies, because of the turbulence of the early years of economic transformation. Therefore, 1995 
seems a reasonable year to start with. We use the same period for the old EU member states for the sake of comparison. 
10 We also look at industry as a whole. However, energy production and water supply may not be fully tradable. Therefore, 
we decided to report only results based on the manufacturing sector. It is interesting to note that productivity growth is 
usually stronger in manufacturing than in industry as a whole in most of the transition economies, while in some old EU 
member countries productivity gains are higher in the energy and water supply sector than in manufacturing.  
11 The share of services in national inflation rates is higher for transition economies than their share in the HICP. Hence, 
earlier studies using weights from national CPI could show somewhat higher rates. However, given that the purpose of the 
HICP is to provide comparable inflation rates across Europe (mainly via adjusting the weights in the national CPI but not 
touching the actual price data), we should clearly use HICP data.   9
market non-tradables. In reality, the impact of dual productivity need not be reflected in a one-to-one 
change in the relative price of market non-tradables given that real wages in the open sector may grow 
faster or lower than productivity, and given that the wage equalisation process across sectors may be 
incomplete or over-proportionate. An amplification effect due to excessive real wage growth in 
tradables is certainly not sustainable in the long-run as it puts external competitiveness at risk and thus 
is not consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson effect. An attenuation effect due to lower wage growth 
compared to productivity gains is, by contrast, absolutely possible even over longer periods of time. 
Hence, a long-term coefficient that connects dual productivity to the relative price of market non-
tradables could certainly be imagined to be lower (but not higher) than unity. 
 
Table 2. The Balassa-Samuelson Effect in Europe, 1995-2005 
  PRODUCTIVITY BALASSA-SAMUELSON  EFFECT 
%  OPEN 
(1) 
CLOSED 
(2) 
DIFF
(1)/(2)
DIFF2 
 
wide narrow wide 2 narrow 2  Literature
Euro area  3.1 0.5 2.5    1.0  0.7      
Austria  5.1 0.4 4.6 4.1-  4.6  1.8  1.6  1.6 1.4  1.4 
Belgium  3.3 1.0 2.3    0.7  0.6     1.7 
France  3.2 0.8 2.4    0.9  0.6     1.1 
Germany  4.3 0.9 3.3 2.9-3.6 1.4  0.8     0.6 
Netherlands  2.6 2.3 0.3 1.5-1.7 0.1  0.1  0.7 0.4  1.2 
Finland  7.7 1.1 6.4  3.6  2.6  1.5  1.5 0.8  1.6 
Italy  0.0 -0.4 0.3 -0.2-0.2 0.1  0.1      1.7 
Ireland  14.4 NA NA    NA  NA      2.6 
Greece  3.8 2.0 1.8    0.7  0.5     1.7 
Portugal  2.1 0.6 1.6    0.6  0.5     0.8 
Spain  0.6 -0.9 1.6    0.6  0.5      1.9 
Denmark  0.6  1.5  -0.9  -1.6 (1), 0.6 (2) -0.3  -0.2       
Sweden  8.6 1.6 6.9    2.7  1.6      
UK  3.6 1.9 1.7    0.7  0.5      
Cyprus  2.3 1.3 1.0  2.2  0.4  0.3  0.8 0.6   
Czech Rep.  8.1  5.0  2.9  5.2 (1), 5.7 (2) 1.0  0.7  1.9  1.3  0.4 
Hungary  8.9 1.7 7.1    2.1  1.6  1.5 1.2  1.7 
Poland  14.3 4.6 9.2    2.4  1.7      1.4 
Slovakia  7.3 0.9 6.3 1.5-2.0 2.1  1.5  0.5 0.4  0.4 
Slovenia  9.2 2.3 6.7  1.1  (3) 2.2  1.6  0.4 0.3  0.8 
Estonia  17.0 8.6 7.8    2.3  1.3      0.5 
Latvia  13.6 7.5 5.7  4.9  1.6  1.1  1.4 0.9  0.5 
Lithuania  15.7 5.7 9.4    2.4  1.7      0.9 
Croatia  5.6 5.0 0.6    0.2  0.1  1.4 0.9  1.2 
Romania  7.4 2.7 4.6    0.8  0.4     0.9 
Notes: Austria, Greece, UK: 1995-2004; Portugal: 1995-2003; Romania: 1995-2002. The columns ‘open’ and ‘closed’ 
contain average labour productivity yearly growth rates for the manufacturing and the market services sectors. For Austria, 
Greece, Portugal, the UK and Romania, the sheltered sector also includes public services, while data is available only for the 
industry as a whole but not for manufacturing in Croatia. ‘DIFF’ is dual productivity growth. ‘DIFFf2’ contains figures 
considerably larger or higher than the ones shown under ‘diff’. 1) and 2) indicate that the alternative measure is obtained 
using data from the 17-sectoral decomposition of Eurostat (NACE17, NewCronos), AMECO and the annual database of the 
WIIW, respectively. WIDE and NARROW indicate that total services and market-based services are used as a share of 
nontradables. DIFF is employed for WIDE2 and NARROW2. If not indicated, the alternative measures are obtained from 
AMECO data. Under ‘literature’ are shown summary data reported in Égert, Halpern and MacDonald (2006, p. 293) for 
transition economies: the inflation differentials due to the B-S effect are corrected by 0.35 percent to obtain inflation rates. 
0.35 percent is used in Égert, Halpern and MacDonald (2006) to transform inflation rates into inflation differentials). Figures 
for the old EU-15 are summary results taken from Égert, Ritzberger-Gruenwald and Silgoner (2005) and corrected for 
inflation differentials if necessary. 
 
Why is the Estimated Size of the Balassa-Samuelson Effect so Low in Emerging 
Europe? 
The small size of the B-S effect is a little surprising considering the massive productivity gains in 
manufacturing that come close to or even exceed a yearly average of 10 percent in all the new member 
states of Central and Eastern Europe from 1995 to 2005. However, a number of factors stop these   10
large productivity gains from feeding into overall inflation. Productivity growth may not lead to 
correspondingly high wage growth in tradables, wages may fail to equalise across sectors, productivity 
gains in non-tradables may offset a price increasing effect of wage spill-over, and finally, productivity-
fuelled non-tradable price increases are dampened in overall inflation because of the low share of non-
tradables in the inflation basket. 
Large Dispersion of Productivity Growth in Tradables 
Importantly, attenuation effects could happen if productivity growth in the open sector, in our case in 
the manufacturing sector, is very concentrated on a few sectors. In such a case, the manufacturing 
sector may not have the nominal wage-setting role needed for the cross-sectoral wage spill-over effect 
to happen, simply because wages increase only for a small proportion of workers (that limits wage 
equalisation) and because productivity growth in the leading sectors may be in excess of 10% or 20%, 
and, consequently, real wage growth will go less sharply than productivity growth.  
We calculated the standard productivity growth deviation in 15 manufacturing sectors.
12 A higher 
dispersion indicates more unevenly distributed productivity growth rates across sectors, and this could 
jeopardise the overall wage-setting role of the open sector. Figure 2a below indicates that the 
dispersion tends to be higher in countries with overall higher productivity growth in the manufacturing 
sector as a whole. This holds true both for the transition economies and for Finland and Sweden. Even 
though a note of caution is once again necessary because the data drawn from different sources 
(NewCronos versus WIIW) for three countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia) show 
substantial differences, these statistical anomalies do not alter the main conclusions. 
 
Figure 2a. Dispersion of Productivity Growth in Manufacturing  
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productivity growth
SD of productivity growth within manufacturing
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat (old EU-15 & Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovenia) and the WIIW annual database (Central and Eastern Europe). 
Note: Data from both sources is available and shown for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. CZ, HU and SI refer to 
the data drawn from the WIIW database, and CZ -2, HU -2 and SI -2 refer to data obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat. 
Incomplete Wage Equalisation and Substantial Productivity Gains in Market Non-
Tradables 
In addition to a possibly imperfect pass-through from productivity to wages in tradables, productivity-
driven wage rises in the open sector may cause a less than proportionate increase in the relative price 
of non-tradables relative to that of tradables if wage equalisation between tradables and non-tradables 
is less than proportionate and if productivity increases also in the non-tradable sector. As shown in 
Figure 2b, wage equalisation is less than perfect in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia, i.e. wages grow 
in tradables compared to market non-tradables. Furthermore, productivity gains are substantial 
                                                 
12 The industries are: food, textile, leather, wood, paper, refinery, chemistry, plastic, other non-metals, metallurgy, machinery, 
electronic equipment, transportation equipment, other manufactured goods. See the Appendix for the sector-specific 
productivity growth rates. Data for the euro area, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are obtained from 
NewCronos/Eurostat. For Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, as well as for the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovenia, the data are drawn from the WIIW’s annual database. We could not collect data for the three Baltic countries.   11
especially in the Baltic countries, offsetting the effects of large productivity gains in the tradable sector 
(see Table 2).  
 
Figure 2b. Difference between average annual gross nominal wage growth in market services and 
manufacturing (1995-2005) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data drawn from the annual database of WIIW. 
Note: The period runs from 1996 to 2005 for Bulgaria and Croatia. The figures are obtained as follows: Average annual 
growth rates for market services are computed using data for (a.) wholesale, retail trade, repair motor veh. b.) hotels and restaurants, 
c.)  transport, storage and communications, d.) financial intermediation  and e.) Real estate, renting & business activities) and constructing an 
average with weights based on the respective size of the sectors in terms of employment. The average wage growth rate is divided by wage 
growth in manufacturing. Averaged over the period from 1995 to 2005  
 
The Low Share of Market Non-Tradables in the HICP 
Finally, the share of market non-tradable in the HICP is low in the transition economies. As Table 3 
below evidences, it ranged, in 2006, from 9.6 percent in Romania and 24.2 percent in Slovenia. By 
comparison, it varies between 22.8 percent (Luxemburg) and 35.3 percent (Austria) in the euro area. 
Consequently, the low share of market non-tradables in the HICP mechanically dampens the impact of 
any productivity growth on overall inflation, even if productivity gains are fully transmitted onto the 
relative price of services. 
Table 3. Weights of Services in the HICP 
 Services    Services 
 All  Market   All  Market 
% 1996  2006 2006  %  1996 2006 2006 
Euro area  33.9  40.8 26.8  Cyprus  23.0 38.0 27.7 
Austria 38.7  47.3 35.3  Malta 38.1 39.9 31.3 
Belgium 31.2  37.8 26.1  Czech  Rep. 27.2 33.0 23.5 
Germany 35.8  43.6 23.7  Hungary  29.8 29.5 23.1 
France 34.1  39.3 25.0  Poland  19.4 26.5 18.2 
Netherlands 34.4  41.6 23.5  Slovakia  20.9 33.9 23.6 
Luxembourg 31.3 31.6 22.8  Slovenia  26.8 33.2 24.2 
Finland 31.9  40.7 23.2  Estonia  12.7 29.2 16.7 
Italy 33.5  40.3 31.5  Latvia  15.9 27.6 19.3 
Ireland 35.4  46.8 32.6  Lithuania  10.5 25.2 18.0 
Spain 29.1  36.5 29.3  Bulgaria  9.4  21.2 15.5 
Portugal 28.1  38.2 30.0  Romania  13.7 16.4 9.6 
Greece 29.5  39.0 24.9  Turkey  20.3 27.8 14.7 
Sweden 33.6  39.5 23.4         
UK 35.9  44.6 31.4         
Denmakr 36.4  38.9 21.6         
Source: The share of total services is the figure provided in NewCronos/Eurostat. The share of market services is the author’s 
calculations based on data for a three-digit COICOP (classification of individual consumption by purpose) disaggregation 
level obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat. For the distinction between market-based and regulated services see the section on 
regulated prices.   12
Going beyond that issue, it is also very interesting to study the share of services in the HICP, given 
that the respective shares in the HICP are derived on the basis of statistical surveys of final household 
expenditures, a rise in the share of services implies a higher share of services in total nominal 
household expenditure. Such an increase could therefore be the outcome of a pure price effect, as 
households spend more on services because they are more expensive. However, and more interestingly 
from a demand-side viewpoint, an increase could also signal that households consume greater 
quantities of services. This is an obvious possibility considering the advances in per capita disposable 
income in all the countries under consideration. Figure 1 sheds some light on this issue by presenting 
average growth rates of final household consumption at constant prices for selected categories which 
can be identified as goods (foodstuffs; clothing) and services (leisure & culture; hotels & restaurants) 
using a 12-sectoral COICOP 
13decomposition. Generally, consumption of services grew faster in real 
terms than that of goods in the old EU countries, with the notable exceptions of Finland, Italy and the 
UK, where consumption of clothing was at least as strong as for services. The picture is more mixed 
for the new member states. Among the countries for which data is available, the consumption of 
services systematically exceeded the consumption of goods in Estonia and Latvia but not in Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Poland or Slovenia. 
The price effect and the quantity effect related to the consumption of services reveal two surprising 
features of the B-S effect. First, the price effect is indeed a self-reinforcing mechanism of the B-S 
effect. Higher productivity causes the relative price of non-tradables to increase, resulting in an 
increase in the share of non-tradables in the HICP. This, ultimately, strengthens the effect of 
productivity-fuelled service price inflation in the HICP. 
Second, the quantity effect provides a bridge between the supply-side B-S effect and the demand-side 
effect suggested by Bergstrand (1991). Higher demand for services raises the share of services in the 
HICP, and this increases the impact on overall inflation of the very same amount of productivity gains. 
Given that prices insulated from the effects of productivity gains via price regulation are parts of 
services, it is essential to filter them out when studying the size of the B-S effect. The share of market 
services, excluding rents, is substantially lower than the share of total services, thus indicating the 
importance of regulated services. Nevertheless, we can still observe that the share of the HICP taken 
by market services is around 10 percentage points more in the old EU countries than in transition 
economies (see Table 3).  
 
Figure 1. Annual Growth Rate of Real Final Household Consumption (1995 constant prices) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat 
Note: The period runs from 1995 to 2003 for Greece, Latvia, Portugal and Spain. 
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4. The Prices of Regulated Services and Goods 
Relative price levels and inflation rates are strongly influenced by government interference in all 
European countries. This observation is particularly relevant for transition economies, but also holds 
true for the old EU member states. However, it is less of a surprise in the light of the results of a 
survey conducted by Dexter, Levi and Nault (2002), according to which roughly one third of the prices 
in the CPI basket of the USA are affected by price regulation. 
We have already seen that the relative price level of non-market services seems to be systematically 
lower than those for market services (consumer services) in both transition economies and in a number 
of Western European countries.  
Differences in wage levels between the market and non-market service sectors could be at the root of 
differences in price levels: wages tend to be lower in the public sector than in the private sector 
because of more job security and lower work load (thus lower productivity) - and this despite a 
generally more high-skilled labour force. But an even more important factor could be the 
disconnection between wages and prices in the public sector since price levels might be kept at an 
artificially low level because of political considerations, or because political decision-making cannot 
or does not want to keep track of the rising price level of market services during episodes of strong 
economic growth (like in Ireland or Finland). 
Figure 3 plots the relative price levels of household energy, such as electricity, gas and fuel. Three 
striking features emerge from this. First, household electricity is much cheaper in transition economies 
than in Western Europe, except for Slovakia. Households pay half the price of the euro area average in 
the three Baltic States and Bulgaria, and they are charged less in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Slovenia than their average euro area counterparts. Differences are even more 
marked for gas prices. This is because the transition economies obtain gas from Russia well below 
market prices. 
Second, even euro area countries such as Spain, France, Austria, Finland and Greece, as well as the 
UK, have significantly lower electricity prices compared to the euro area average, both for pre- and 
after tax prices. However, differences in gas prices are visibly attributable to differing taxes, given the 
small dispersion of prices excluding taxes. 
Third, the price level of fuel is very similar across countries, when taxes are not considered.
14 
However, the differences more than double after all taxes are considered. This is not surprising in the 
light of the considerable lower excise taxes
15 applied to household energy, gas and fuel prices in the 
transition economies. Price level convergence will, however, occur in the near future due to European 
integration. All countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 will have to comply with the minimum 
rates given by EU legislation after some years of transition ending between 2007 and 2014. 
                                                 
14 The reason why net fuel prices net of taxes are more comparable across countries than gas and electricity prices is that 
there is a world market for oil but not for gas and electricity. 
15 Excise taxes not only concern energy products but also apply to alcoholic beverages and manufactured tobacco goods.   14
Figure 3. Relative Price Level of Energy (euro area=1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat 
Regulated prices
16 matter not only for the price level but also for inflation developments. The first 
reason for this is that they generally account for a large part of the consumer price index. As Table 4 
demonstrates, regulated prices represent between 10 percent and 30 percent of overall HICP according 
to the definition of regulated prices. 
The question of which items in the consumer price basket should be viewed as regulated is, as a matter 
of fact, not uncontroversial. A narrow definition proposed in ECB (2003a) considers the following 
subcategories as regulated: 1.) refuse collection, 2.) sewerage collection, 3.) medical and paramedical 
services, 4.) dental services, 5.) hospital services, 6.) passenger transport by railway, 7.) postal 
services, 8.) education and 9.) social protection. Lünneman and Mathä (2005) complete this list with 
1.) cultural services and 2.) passenger transport by road. 
An intermediate definition would also include rents given that in a score of countries, both in Central 
and Eastern Europe and in Western Europe, they are heavily influenced by the large number of social 
housing owned by central and local governments. Finally, the widest definition would also include 
energy prices related to housing, notably 1.) electricity, 2.) gas, 3.) liquid and solid fuels and 4.) heat 
energy. 
                                                 
16 The terms administered, administrative and regulated prices are used interchangeably in the rest of the paper. 
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One problem with this classification is that the degree of regulation might change over time. In 
particular, the degree of regulation might decrease if there is a change in ownership structure, such as a 
move from public to private ownership, or if there is market liberalisation. This line of reasoning is 
reflected in the figures regarding the share of regulated prices in overall CPI published regularly in the 
EBRD’s Transition Reports, where the share of regulated prices drops to zero in some countries with 
advances in market reforms (see Table 4). However, the privatisation of sectors like water, sewage, 
electricity or rail transport cannot establish true market competition, which necessitates some sort of 
price regulatory schemes. Hence, privatisation does not automatically remove but possibly only 
alleviate price regulation. 
Whereas price regulation mostly concerns services, the prices of some goods can also be affected 
directly or indirectly by public administration decisions. The prices of pharmaceutical products, such 
as medicines, which are fully or partly reimbursed by the healthcare system, are directly influenced by 
the subsidy levels. The second group of goods includes alcoholic beverages, tobacco and fuel for 
personal transportation: their prices are influenced by occasional changes in a range of taxes other than 
VAT
17. 
The share of narrowly defined regulated service prices (excluding both rents and household energy) in 
the HICP ranges from around 6 percent to roughly 10 percent, both in the new member states and in 
euro area countries, as shown in Table 4. On the basis of the intermediate definition comprising rents 
but excluding household energy, the share of regulated services increases considerably up to 21 
percent in the euro area, but remains below 11 percent in transition economies. This is because owner 
occupancy ratios are lower in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe, and this is reflected 
in higher household expenditure on rents in the former group of countries. However, regulated 
services become more aligned when looking at the broadest definition, mainly due to the higher share 
of household energy in total household consumption in the new member states. 
When it comes to looking at regulated goods (as opposed to regulated services), the shares are clearly 
higher in transition economies both for goods concerned directly and indirectly by price regulation. 
This is chiefly attributable to higher consumption of pharmaceutical products and fuel in total 
household consumption. 
                                                 
17 At the extreme, all products could be considered as regulated because changes in the VAT or whether they are reclassified 
from reduced to standard VAT rate (or vice versa) influences the final consumer price. However, the number of different 
taxes that apply to the aforementioned three items makes them more prone to public interference via taxes than the rest of the 
consumer basket.   16
Table 4. The share of regulated prices in the HICP (Eurostat, 2006) 
and in the CPI (EBRD, 2005) 
 %  no rent  with rent with rent &
hh energy 
goods
direct
goods 
indirect
Total 
Narrow
Total 
Broad 
EBRD 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (1)+(4) (3)+(4)+(5)   
Euro area  8.4  14.7  19.7 1.3  6.5 9.6  27.5   
Austria   9.1  12.7  16.9 1.0  5.9  10.0 23.8   
Belgium   6.6  13.0  19.0  1.7  7.4  8.4  28.1   
Germany   10.6  21.4  28.1 1.3  7.1  11.8 36.5   
France 8.5  15.1  19.7  1.3  7.1  9.8  28.2  
Netherlands   8.3  15.9  21.4  0.5  6.7  8.8  28.7   
Luxemb. 5.5 9.0  12.1 0.7  12.9  6.2  25.7   
Ireland 10.0  12.6 17.2  0.6  8.4  10.6  26.2  
Italy   6.2  9.0  13.0  1.5  4.2  7.7  18.8   
Finland   9.3  17.8  20.4 2.0  9.8  11.3 32.1   
Greece 11.3  14.6 18.6  0.4  5.3  11.7  24.3  
Portugal 7.3 9.3  13.3 1.8  6.8  9.1 21.8   
Spain   5.9  8.2  12.3  1.0  7.0  6.9  20.3   
Denmark 10.8 18.6  26.1 1.0  7.2  11.8 34.2   
Sweden 7.0  16.9 24.3  0.9  8.7  7.9 33.9   
UK   9.6  14.3  17.5  0.5 6.2 10.1  24.2   
Cyprus 9.3  10.7 15.2 1.2  9.4  10.5 25.8   
Malta 6.3  6.8 8.8  1.2 7.3  7.4  17.3   
Czech Rep.  7.4  11.1  21.0 1.0  10.2  8.5  32.2  10.9 
Hungary 7.8 7.9  15.9 2.8 11.2 10.6  29.9  17.0 
Poland 7.5  9.9 19.8  4.4 11.6 11.9  35.8  1.2 
Slovakia 9.4  11.2  26.8 1.4 7.5 10.8  35.8  19.9 
Slovenia 8.1  10.1  16.7 1.3  9.2 9.4  27.2  16.7 
Estonia 7.4  8.9  15.6  1.7 12.5  9.1  29.8  26.7 
Latvia 8.3  9.3  17.2  2.6 8.5 10.9  28.2  14.3 
Lithuania 6.9  7.5  15.5  2.8  11.6 9.8  29.9  na 
Bulgaria 6.9 7.3  20.0 4.8 5.5 11.6  30.2  21.3 
Romania 8.0 8.4  22.8 2.1 6.4 10.2  31.4  21.9 
Turkey 10.1  14.7 23.0  0.8  5.1  10.9  28.9   
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2005 and author’s calculations based on data obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat using a 
three-digit COICOP disaggregation level of the HICP and the three definitions spelled out earlier. The figure obtained for 
Slovakia from the EBRD refers to 2004. 
Regulated prices matter for overall inflation developments not only because of their high share in the 
HICP but also because they usually exhibit a peculiar evolution over time. First, changes are 
infrequent. They may take place at the beginning of the year. Also, they may be related to the timing 
of general elections with politicians being more willing to increase regulated prices after rather than 
before elections. Second, if regulated prices are changed, the price modification might be very large. 
This is especially well illustrated in Figures 4a to 4d both for transition economies (Estonia, Lithuania 
and Slovakia) and for the euro area (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands). 
Figures 4a and 4b also witness the very heterogeneous development of regulated services with regard 
to the timing and the magnitude of changes in the euro area and in Denmark, the UK and Sweden. It is 
also apparent that while regulated service prices exceeded average inflation in Ireland, the UK and 
perhaps also in Austria, Portugal and Denmark, year-on-year regulated price inflation was partly 
below and partly above the overall inflation rate in the rest of the EU-15. 
When looking at developments in Central and Eastern Europe, the striking difference is that regulated 
service price inflation, irrespective of the definition (narrow or broad), is persistently above average 
inflation. 
The reason for these above-average changes is partly rooted in the early days of the transition process 
when the prices of regulated services were kept unchanged, while the prices of most of the goods and 
market services were set free. Price liberalisation led to very high inflation rates, which resulted in a   17
widening gap between regulated and market service prices.
18 Keeping regulated prices unchanged 
during the early 1990s, which helped stem hyperinflation, was made possible by the fact that only 
operational costs had to be taken into account by the price setting procedure given that, as Zavoico 
(1995) puts it, the capital stock of the sectors falling under price regulation were inherited for free 
from the socialist regime. However, by the time the main storm of price liberalisation was over, two 
factors surfaced and had to be considered in setting the price of regulated items: a.) capital 
maintenance costs and b.) the replacement of the capital stock at market prices. This came at the cost 
of large price increases given that most of the sectors concerned are very capital intensive. 
There are three main reasons why regulated prices kept and will keep on rising faster than most of the 
components of the CPI in transition economies. Firstly, prices were below cost recovery in most 
transition economies. While the gap between end-user prices and cost recovery prices has been 
considerably reduced, electricity, gas and water prices were still below cost recovery in a number of 
cases in 2003 as shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Cost recovery levels in the energy and water sectors 
 Electricity  Gas  Water  supply 
 2000  2003  2000 2003 2000  2003 
Bulgaria  0.43 (0.40) 0.67 (0.71) 0.55 0.67  0.48  0.77 
Croatia  0.62 (0.90) 0.79 (0.99) 0.89
a  1.02
b  0.50 -- 
Czech Rep.  (0.60) (1.00)  --  --  1.00  -- 
Estonia  (0.80) (0.87)  --  --  --  0.81
 b 
Hungary  (0.70) (1.01)  --  --  --   
Latvia  (0.80) (0.88)  --  --  --  0.77
 b 
Lithuania  (0.80) (0.97)  --  --  -- -- 
Poland  0.95 (1.10) 0.82 (0.82) 0.68 0.89
b 0.86 0.84 
Romania  0.48 (0.60) 0.80 (0.81) 0.60 0.92  --  0.40 
Slovakia  (0.70) (1.00)  --  --  -- -- 
Turkey  0.73 (1.03) 1.03 (1.09) 1.54 1.82
 b -- -- 
Sources: ECA INFRASTRUCTURE INDICATORS DATABASE (World Bank), EBRD (2001), p 95 for figures 
in parentheses for electricity for 2000; World Bank (2006a), p. 35 for figures in parentheses for electricity for 
2003; World Bank (2003), p. 45 for Croatia for water supply. 
Note: The cost recovery ratio is obtained as the weighted average of (residential and non-residential) end user 
tariff over the cost recovery tariff. The EBRD figures refer to residential end user tariffs. 
a2001
  
b2002 
The gap between end-user prices and cost recovery prices is sustained by direct (concerning the prices) 
and indirect (concerning firms’ balance sheets) public subsidies, which are, however, disappearing 
because of efforts to sort out public finance and because of EU competition rules. This has led to 
substantial price increases. It is worthwhile mentioning that raising prices to cost recovery price levels 
does not suffice to eliminate the need for public subsidies. As a recent report by the World Bank 
(2006b) shows, the need for public subsidies arises from problems related to fee collection and 
because of unaccounted losses, mainly due to leaking and inefficient transport pipelines and theft. 
Secondly, the capital stock of some of the sectors (e.g. railways and public transportation) is very 
obsolete and needs to be renewed to improve the quality of the services and to catch-up with EU 
standards. This implies massive investments and price increases in the absence of public subsidies, 
both of which may, however, be mitigated by transfers from EU Structural and Cohesion Funds. 
Finally, the road towards the consolidation of the sectors providing regulated services is very bumpy 
and is characterised by numerous setbacks due to changes in political agendas as a result of 
elections.
19 Hence, longer delays on the road may be followed by more pronounced upward price 
                                                 
18 During the more recent episode of hyperinflation of 1997 in Bulgaria, the growth rate of regulated prices remained also 
well below the overall inflation rate. 
19 Price increases could be limited by enhancing efficiency through privatisation and market liberalisation. However, as 
already noted, true market competition is not always possible, and an appropriate price regulatory framework needs to be 
established in such cases.   18
corrections later on. It is worthwhile mentioning that these problems may also hold true in parts of the 
euro area and in particular in poorer member states such as Greece and Portugal. 
It is important to emphasise that changes in regulated services have no direct link to the B-S effect in 
the medium to long run because public interference in price–setting, and the impact of the upgrading 
of the capital stock on prices, outweigh the effects of wage pressures coming from the tradable sector 
due to productivity gains in that sector. Nevertheless, price developments of regulated services cannot 
probably fully escape in the very long run from the wage pressures of the tradable sector attributable to 
the B-S effect. 
Figure 4a Regulated service prices in the euro area (year-on-year changes), 1997-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat. 
Note: reg pr1 refers to the narrow definition of regulated services. 
Figure 4b Regulated service prices in Denmark, UK and Sweden (year-on-year changes) 
1997-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat. 
Note: reg pr1 refers to the narrow definition of regulated services. 
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Figure 4c Regulated service prices in Cyprus and Malta (year-on-year changes), 1997-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat. 
Note: reg pr1 and reg pr3 refer to the narrow and the broad definitions of regulated services. 
 
Figure 4d Regulated service prices in Central and Eastern Europe (year-on-year changes), 
1997-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat. 
Note: reg pr1 and reg pr3 refer to the narrow and the broad definitions of regulated services. 
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5. Residential House Prices 
House prices, measured as the euro price of a square metre, are substantially lower in transition 
economies than the euro area. However, there are huge regional divides, in particular between capital 
cities (and urban areas) and other regions. In Budapest and Warsaw, house prices are twice as high as 
in the countryside, and there is a more than threefold difference between Prague and the Czech 
countryside. As a result of substantially higher house prices in the capital cities, the east-west 
differences become smaller. For instance, the price of a square meter is between 1100 and 1300 euros 
in Budapest, Warsaw, Riga, Bucharest and Prague, and this level is only slightly below the 1500 to 
1600 euros we can observe in Brussels, Berlin and Vienna. At the same time, house prices are the 
most heterogeneous segment of the price level in euro area as house prices in Madrid and Paris are 
nearly four times higher than in Brussels, Berlin and Vienna (Figure 5a). 
Over the last ten years or so, house prices grew at a rapid pace in Central and Eastern Europe, and 
house price developments are in sharp contrast with the evolution of the overall inflation index in a 
number of transition economies. While the CPI moved to one-digit territory in most of the countries 
over the last couple of years, house prices started to rise at two-digit pace, in particular in Bulgaria, 
Estonia and Lithuania where year-on-year house price inflation reached or even exceeded 60 percent 
at some point during the last five years or so. While house prices grew at a lower pace in Slovenia, 
they were above inflation. In Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, house price inflation 
exhibited high growth rates only periodically and decelerated to or even below headline inflation 
(Figure 5b). 
Figure 5a. Selected House Prices in Central and Eastern Europe (euro/m2), 2005 
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Figure 5b. House Prices in Central and Eastern Europe (year-on-year changes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data obtained from national statistical offices and central banks. 
 
High house price inflation raises the question of what the driving forces underlying these increases are. 
Increased house prices can be indeed be separated into the following two components: 1.) general and 
transition-specific fundamentals and 2.) house price increases reflecting and/or leading to house price 
misalignments. 
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Price increases due to changes in the fundamentals: The determinants of house prices (P
H) can be 
obtained from the demand for housing (D
H) (equation (1)) and from the supply of housing (S
H) if 
demand equals supply (see e.g. UK HM Treasury, 2003; Gallin, 2003).  
) , , , , , , , (
/ + + − + + − + −
=
H H H N X e D WE r Y P f D        ( 1 )  
) ) , , ( , (
+ +
= M W P C P f S
L H H         ( 2 )  
) ) , , ( , , , , , , , (
/ + + + − + + − +
= M W P C N X e D WE r Y f P
L H H      (3) 
Demand for housing can be written as a function of house prices (P
H), income (Y), the real interest rate 
on housing loans (r), financial wealth (WE), demographic and labour market factors such as the share 
of the labour force in total population or the unemployment rate (D), the expected rate of return on 
housing (e), the need for housing (N
H) and other demand shifters (X).  
The need for housing can be further separated into 1.) new housing due to the need for better quality 
housing and due to geographical reallocation of populations, 2,) the difference between the existing 
housing stock and the desired housing stock, and 3.) the expected change in the number of households 
(Dhonte, Bhattacharya and Yousef, 2000). This latter factor indeed overlaps to some extent with the 
other demographic variables. 
The supply of housing can be thought of as depending on house prices and on the real costs of 
construction (C) including the price of land (P
L), wages (W) and material costs (M).  
The evolution of the price of land is closely related to economic geography arguments. The progress in 
urbanisation and the increase in concentration of economic activity at given locations leads to the 
scarcity of land in urban areas, thus increasing land prices (Glaeser, 1998; Quigley, 1998). Hence, 
house prices will rise faster than construction prices including wages and materials, merely because of 
the rise in the price of land. The scarcity of land in urban areas may be further exacerbated by 
institutional factors such as zoning and restrictive building regulations (Case and Meyer, 1995; 
Glaeser and Gyourko, 2002; and Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks, 2003). 
Transition/catching-up specific fundamentals: 
House prices in transition economies are bound to increase due to increases in construction costs for 
the following reasons: 
1.) Quality changes: A huge quality increase in the supply of new residential and commercial 
properties can be observed in transition economies. This quality increase shows up in construction 
costs if quality changes are not adjusted for. To illustrate this point, it suffices to say that the housing 
stock during the early 1990s consisted mostly of apartment blocks made of concrete in urban areas, 
and of cubiform village houses in rural areas. New residential property (flats, terraced and family 
houses) is of much better quality. 
The overall quality of the housing stock in Central and Eastern Europe, except for the Czech Republic 
and Slovenia, lags far behind Western European standards, as shown, for example, by the share of 
dwellings with piped water and flush toilets as a share in the total dwelling stock (see Figure 6). An 
increase in quality would be necessarily reflected in higher prices.   22
Figure 6. Dwellings with piped water (left-hand side) and with flush toilet (right-hand side) 
as % of the total dwelling stock, around 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD 
 
2.) Wages: Another cost-push factor is the continuous increase in wages as a result of advances in real 
convergence. This could cause a rise in construction costs, unless counterbalanced by productivity 
gains in the construction sector. 
Regarding the price of land, changes can occur with more economic concentration. This is probably 
one main reason for capital/countryside divides, given that economic activity in capital cities is more 
buoyant than in the countryside. Cities attract more economic activity and create economies of scales, 
and this leads to further concentration. This in turns increases the scarcity of land and pushes prices 
up. 
Overall demand is typically strengthened in transition economies via two channels. The first is the 
rapid development of the credit and mortgage markets. Not only is it easier to get credit for the 
purchase of a house, but also loan to value ratios and average maturities have been extended, and new 
financial innovations appeared on the market, such as accordion loans.
20 Looser financial constraints 
naturally increase demand. The second channel is related to capital account liberalisation and the 
appearance of foreign investors on the market. The fact that demand is not limited to the population of 
the country but extends to the whole EU or even the developed world, increases potential demand. A 
rise in demand due to these two factors could well be viewed as sustainable from a longer run 
perspective. Nevertheless, both factors can trigger a house-price frenzy.
21 
Notwithstanding the similarity of some of new and old EU member states in terms of significant house 
price increases, the impact of these increases on the inflation rates is possibly very different. This is 
because the share of rents in the HICP is considerably lower in the new member states than in the old 
ones due to significantly higher ownership occupancy ratios in the former and the ensuing lower share 
of rents in household expenditures.
22 
                                                 
20 An accordion loan usually means that the monthly instalment are fixed throughout the lifetime of the loan. However, 
changes in the interest rate (and in the exchange rate for FX denominated loans), are absorbed by the adjustment of the 
maturity of the loan. 
21 See e.g. Égert and Mihaljek (2007) for an empirical analysis regarding these factors in Central and Eastern Europe. 
22 Price increases reflecting house price misalignment: In common with other segments of the economy, a peculiarity of 
house prices is the strong distortion of their relative price to goods prices as an inheritance from central planning. Indeed, in 
most of the transition economies, the price of a square metre of housing surface was probably lower than what would have 
been predicted by the underlying fundamentals. As a result, part of the increase might be due to an adjustment from low 
initial levels to that implied by economic fundamentals (adjustment from initial undershooting). House price increases may 
also reflect price developments, which are not related to changes in the domestic fundamental variables or to the adjustment 
process from initial undershooting. Such a growth can be labelled as excessive and is expected to be corrected at some point 
in time (excessive growth in house prices). 
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Table 6. The share of rents in the HICP (Eurostat, 2002-2005) and ownership occupancy 
ratios (2001) 
%  % rents in HICP  Ownership 
Occupancy ratio    % rents in HICP  Ownership 
Occupancy ratio
Euro area  6.4    Cyprus  1.0  n.a. 
Austria 3.7  56.8  Malta  0.5  n.a. 
Belgium 6.4  66.4      
Germany 11.1  42.2  Czech  R. 4.5  71.5 
France 6.4  56.0  Hungary  0.1  89.6 
Netherlands 7.9  50.4 Poland  3.8  n.a. 
Luxemb. 3.7  66.6  Slovakia 1.5  49.2 
Finland 7.7  n.a.  Slovenia 2.3  90.0 
Italy 2.8  67.4  Estonia  1.7  85.2 
Ireland 2.7  80.0  Latvia  1.0  74.8 
Spain 2.2  n.a.  Lithuania 0.3 91.1 
Portugal 1.9  75.4  Bulgaria  0.4  92.2 
Greece 3.2  n.a.  Romania 0.3  n.a. 
Sweden 9.9  39.9  Turkey  5.0  n.a. 
UK 4.9  71.3       
Denmark 7.8  53.1       
Source: rents: NewCronos/EurostatEBRD, ownership occupancy ratio: Czech Statistical Office. 
 
6. Market-Based Goods Prices 
We have shown that even goods prices in Central and Eastern Europe are lower than in Western 
Europe. One could think of a number of reasons why the price level of goods differs across countries 
at different stages of economic development: differences in the quality of goods, pricing-to-market 
practices and the importance of local factors such as local tastes, the distribution sector and national 
tax systems. 
6.1. The Quality of Goods 
Prices may differ because the quality of the goods consumed in the different countries also differs.
23 
In particular, households in poorer countries tend to buy poorer quality goods simply because they are 
cheaper. By contrast, households of wealthier nations pay more attention to the quality of the goods 
they purchase and are prepared to pay a correspondingly higher price. 
This could be formulated as an extension of Engel’s Law according to which richer households spend 
less of their budget on food than poorer households: Not only there is a shift away from food in private 
household spending as households grow richer but households also upgrade the quality of the goods 
(including foodstuff) included in their consumption basket.
24 In other words, wealthier consumers are 
more quality sensitive, while poorer households are more sensitive to prices.
25 
The quality argument is closely related to the so-called brand effect. Given that brands usually stand 
for higher quality, and are associated with higher prices, richer consumers tend to buy more branded 
and thus more expensive goods than poorer ones. 
                                                 
23 Note that the quality argument could also apply for service prices. 
24 A rise in quality also implies an increase in the variety of goods as the less well-off part of the population continues to 
consume goods of lower quality. 
25 There is ample anecdotal evidence of this. It suffices to walk into a supermarket in Austria, and one would find only first 
class fruits and vegetables, while it would be an easy task for a visitor to a supermarket on the Hungarian or Czech side of the 
border to detect numerous fruits and vegetables classified as second class. Importantly, most of those fruits and vegetables 
are not home grown but are coming from all over Europe and the world. Also, while large department stores offering cheap 
and thus low-quality Chinese textile products are mushrooming nowadays in Central and Eastern Europe, they are almost 
unknown in most of Western Europe. However, speak to a vendor in such a store, and you will soon learn that it is not 
possible to sell the very cheapest and very-low quality T-shirts and shoes anymore, probably because households can afford 
to spend more on clothing ten years ago.   24
A shift towards higher goods prices can occur through a simple shift towards better quality goods. 
However, a special case of this shift may occur in fast catching-up transition economies, where this 
shift towards more quality goods on the consumer side is matched with a shift towards more quality 
goods on the producer side. A characteristic of the transition and real convergence process is the build-
up of production capacities to produce goods of better quality, chiefly thanks to FDI inflows to the 
manufacturing sector. The initially low-quality home products will enhance their reputations, and new 
local brands will emerge or the low-quality home brands will be replaced by high-quality international 
brands. Also, product names, which recall the socialist era, are used now to launch new product lines 
of higher quality (and to ride on the wave of retro fashion wave). As a result, as argued in higher 
prices can be set for the goods of improved quality and the shift towards better quality in household 
consumption will be achieved improved goods and produced in the home country rather than via 
imported goods.
26 
6.2. Pricing-to-Market Practices 
It is not surprising that the prices of goods are different across countries if the composition of the 
goods in the compared baskets is not the same. It is therefore advisable to look at the price level of 
homogenous goods to see whether price level differences are due to the composition effect. The car 
price data published every year by the European Commission makes such a comparison possible, 
given that the prices obtained from the official price lists of the major car manufacturers refer to the 
very same model with the same equipment and parameters.  
Figure 8 hereafter summarises the relative price levels
27 of different segments of the markets. The 
most striking observation is that car prices in the CEECs but also in Cyprus, Malta and Greece are 
generally lower than the euro area average. In particular, price differences are the most pronounced 
(around 10 percent) for smaller cars (segments B, C and D)
28. This might indicate that car 
manufacturers are setting prices deliberately lower for smaller cars in the new member states because 
of the lower disposable income of households in those countries.
29 
At the same time, price differences vanish as we move towards the higher end of the spectrum, i.e. for 
luxury cars (segments E and F), implying the absence of pricing-to-market for this segment of the 
market, probably because the price elasticity of demand is much lower for luxury cars than for smaller 
cars. 
However, there seem to be some outliers. On the one hand, the prices of small cars are very close to 
the euro area average in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, and the prices of the more 
expensive cars are even above euro area average. On the other hand, cars in the small car segments are 
cheapest in Hungary (around 15 percent cheaper). This divergence can be clearly explained by recent 
developments of the nominal exchange rates against the euro. Given that the price data provided by the 
European Commission is collected during the first quarter of 2006, and given that the Czech and 
Polish currencies appreciated by around 6 percent vis-à-vis the euro, the Slovak koruna also 
strengthened somewhat while the Hungarian forint depreciated by 5 percent between early 2005 and 
early 2006 as shown on Figure 9, higher prices in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia and lower 
prices in Hungary simply reflect the evolution of exchange rates.
30 If we correct for these changes, the 
price level of small cars would stand at around 90 percent of the euro area average in all four countries 
and the price of luxury cars would be in parity with euro area prices. This observation indeed sheds 
light on the fact that car manufacturers are resorting to local currency pricing (LCP), i.e. they 
                                                 
26 See e.g. Égert, Lommatzsch and Lahrèche-Révil (2006) for empirical evidence for this happening on the basis of the real 
exchange rate and Brůha and Podpiera (2007) for a theoretical modelling of the real exchange rate by introducing investment 
into quality in a New Open Economy Macroeconomics model. 
27 The data shown include VAT. However, the picture remains very similar for pre-tax prices. 
28 For some reason, smaller cars are below euro area average also in Finland and Denmark 
29 When looking at individual car manufacturer, a few of them do not discriminate between markets even for the small car 
segment.  
30 If the price is fixed in the domestic currency and if the exchange rate appreciates (depreciates), the price in euro will rise 
(fall).   25
determine car prices in the domestic currency, correcting prices only with substantial delays.
31 
Therefore, nominal exchange rate appreciation or depreciation is automatically mirrored in a rise or 
fall in the euro price. 
 
Figure 8. The Relative Price Level of Cars (euro area=1, 2006) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data obtained from the European Commission (DG Competition). 
Note: Euro area average is computed as the unweighted arithmetic average of the euro area excluding Luxembourg. Segment 
B includes small cars like Ford Fiesta or Opel Corsa, while segment F comprises luxury cars such as Audi A8, Mercedes 
S350 or BMW 740i. The average price level of each segment (B, C, D, E, F) is calculated as the simple average of the price 
of 12, 13, 15, 6 and 3 models, respectively. 
 
Figure 9. Nominal Exchange Rate against the Euro (2005 January=1) 
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Source: National central banks via the WIIW Monthly Database. 
Note: An increase (decrease) indicates an appreciaton (depreciation). 
 
6.3. The Importance of Local Factors 
6.3.1. Limited Tradability and Local Tastes 
Most obvious is the difference in the relative price of goods for non-durable goods. Non-durable goods 
very often include goods that are produced and consumed in the home country and which are not 
subject to international competition. For instance, trade in fresh bakery and dairy products is seriously 
limited due to short conservation periods, and also because of very country-specific products across 
countries. There are indeed a number of goods that are consumed only in one country but not in the 
others, eliminating the possibility of cross-border trade. The upshot is that the price of these goods is 
determined in the domestic market. This is precisely here that the B-S effect kicks in given that these 
goods are labour-intensive, and, as a result, the general wage level is a major determinant of their price 
                                                 
31 Note, however, the LCP is not necessary for pricing-to-market, because differentiating in prices across markets could be 
also achieved using Producer Currency Pricing (PCP), i.e. when the price of goods is fixed in the currency of the producer. In 
such a case, changes in the exchange rate could amplify or diminish price differences across markets.   26
level. Hence, the price level of these goods will be lower in poorer countries because of the lower 
overall wage level attributable to lower productivity levels in the tradable sector. Nevertheless, the 
prices of these goods will increase in line with the rise of the overall wage level due to productivity 
gains in the open sector, which is mostly not compensated for by productivity gains in the sectors 
concerned. 
Analogously, let us consider a good, which incorporates both inputs traded internationally and local 
non-tradable inputs (see Engel, 1999). Consequently, the price of the good (
G P ) is a weighted average 
of the price of the tradable and non-tradable components as shown in equation (8): 
 
NT T G P P P ⋅ − + ⋅ = ) 1 ( α α       ( 8 )  
Hence, in the case of low-wage countries, the higher the share of non-tradables, the lower the price of 
the good considered. 
6.3.2. Distribution Sector 
Goods may contain local non-tradable inputs not only at the production level. Another layer of local 
costs due to wholesale and retail distribution are in fact part of the final consumer price as shown 
below: 
  ) , , , , ( ) 1 ( T M U R W C P P P
D NT T G + ⋅ − + ⋅ = α α    (9) 
where C
D is the cost of distribution, which can be further decomposed into a.) wage costs (W), b.) 
rents (R), c.) utilities such as water and electricity (U), d.) marketing costs (M) and e.) transportation 
related to the moving of goods to the outlets (T). 
Evidently, the price of the very same good will be lower in the poorer country than the richer country 
simply because of cheaper distribution due to lower overall wage level and the resulting lower non-
tradable price level in the poorer country. 
However, this is true only if the level of labour productivity in the distribution sector is the same 
across the two countries, because what really matters is the level of productivity in the distribution 
sector. Higher productivity implies lower unit labour costs (wage over productivity) and thus lower 
consumer prices. As a consequence, high-wage countries need not have higher distribution costs if 
their distribution sectors are highly efficient. 
As far as inflation developments are concerned, a catching-up in productivity in the open sector should 
lead to a rise in distribution costs, implying a rise in the consumer price of goods. Again, however, this 
holds true only if productivity does not change in the distribution sector since productivity gains could 
counterbalance the wage pressure coming from the open sector. 
With this in mind, we set out to analyse the distribution sector in Europe. As Figure 10 indicates, there 
were remarkable productivity gains in the distribution sector in most of Central and Eastern Europe, in 
particular in the three Baltic countries, the Czech Republic and Poland. This suggests that real 
convergence does not exert an upward push on goods prices through the distribution sector, or even 
goods prices could decrease thanks to a much more efficient distribution sector. 
 
Table 7. Regulation of the Distribution Sector, 2003 
Specific regulation of large outlet    Protection of existing firms   Regulation of shop opening hours   
Czech republic (1998)  0.0  Czech republic  0.0 Czech republic  0.0
Netherlands 0.0  Hungary  0.0 Hungary  0.0
Portugal 0.0  Ireland  0.0 Ireland  0.0
Sweden 0.0  Portugal  0.0 Slovak  Republic  0.0
United Kingdom  0.0  Slovak Republic  0.0 Sweden  0.0
Hungary 1.0  United  Kingdom  0.0 Greece  3.5
Turkey 1.8  Austria  3.0 Italy  3.5
Ireland 2.0  Finland  3.0 Turkey 3.5
Slovak Republic  2.5  Germany  3.0 Poland  4.0
Finland 3.0  Italy  3.0 Portugal 4.0
Italy 3.0  Netherlands  3.0 Austria  5.5
Poland 3.0  Poland  3.0 Denmark  5.5
Spain 3.0  Spain  3.0 Finland  5.5
Denmark 4.0  Sweden  3.0 Germany 5.5
Austria 5.0  Turkey  3.0 Spain  5.5  27
Belgium 5.0  Belgium  6.0 Belgium 6.0
Germany 5.0  Denmark  6.0 France  6.0
France 6.0  France  6.0 Netherlands  6.0
Greece 6.0  Greece  6.0 United  Kingdom  6.0
Source: OECD Regulatory Indicators 
 
Figure 10. Productivity Growth in the Distribution Sector, Annual Averages, 1995-2004 
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Source: Author’s calculations using NewCronos/Eurostat data. 
Note: 1995-2003 for Sweden and Lithuania 
 
As a matter of fact, retail distribution was profoundly transformed in Central and Eastern Europe over 
the last 10 years or so as large hypermarket chains from the old EU-15 countries appeared in the 
region in the second half of the 1990s and the discounters moved to the region during the last five 
years, putting an end to the supremacy of the small corner shops and medium-size supermarket chains, 
and spurring considerable advances in the sector’s efficiency.
32 It is worth mentioning that most of the 
large hypermarket and discounter chains are now present in Central Europe. By contrast, the Western 
European retail markets appear to be more fragmented as the French retailers concentrate on the Latin 
countries, the British ones on the UK and Ireland, whereas Germany and Austria is dominated by 
smaller discounter chains. As can be seen from Figure 11, the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia make up, after Ireland and France, one of the regions in Europe most 
densely covered by hypermarket stores, measured in terms of the number of hypermarkets per million 
inhabitants. Latvia, Lithuania and Poland match with the European average.  
Two interesting observations deserve some attention. First, while Central Europe is the battlefield of 
all large European hypermarket and discounter retail chains, the Baltic countries form a distinct 
geographical market dominated by Scandinavian retailers and home-grown champions. Second, the 
large retailers are strikingly absent in Slovenia and in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. 
Figure 11. Productivity Growth in the Distribution Sector, Annual Average 1995-2005. 
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Source: Author’s calculations using NewCronos/Eurostat data and data collected from the internet (see Appendix). 
                                                 
32 They are not only much more efficient in terms of turnover and profit per workers and per surface, but they are also less 
subject to changes in the property market because these chains usually own the ground and the building of their stores as 
opposed to small shops, where the owners mostly rent the shop.   28
6.3.3. National Tax Systems 
Another widely recognised factor, which prohibits the equalisation of goods prices across countries, is 
the existence of national tax systems including most importantly value-added tax and other kinds of 
indirect taxes. Even if local factors were similar in the countries, a difference in the VAT rate (τ ) 
would bring about persistent differences in the price level of consumer goods: 
  ) 1 ( )) , , , , ( ) 1 ( ( τ α α + ⋅ + ⋅ − + ⋅ = T M U R W C P P P
D NT T G    (10) 
A first glance at Figure 12 would not lead us to conclude that differences in standard rates would 
explain much of the differences in overall price levels observed in particular between new and old EU 
member states.
33 The surprisingly similar standard VAT rates could be even viewed as a success story 
of tax harmonisation, in part spurred by the EU standards in this area. Nevertheless, a number of 
countries also have reduced and super reduced rates besides the standard VAT rate. Some countries 
even apply zero rates or so-called parking rates to a limited set of goods and services. Although this 
makes the task of assessing which part of the price level differences are due to different VAT rates a 
little more complicated, it would probably not alter the first conclusion that different VAT rates are 
overall not the major factor behind different price levels.
34 
Nonetheless, VAT changes are bound to generate sudden moves in a country’s inflation rate, at least in 
the short run. In the period after 1996, a number of increases in the VAT rates took place in Europe. 
Some old member states did some upward adjustment to the standard rate by 1 or 2 percentage points. 
Exceptions are France, where the standard rate was cut from 20.6 percent to 19.6 percent in April 2000 
and Germany, where an increase of the standard rate by 3 percentage points took effect in January 
2007. By contrast, changes in the VAT rate were larger in the new member states and went into both 
directions. The Czech Republic and the Baltic states reduced VAT rates, while Cyprus and Slovenia 
increased them. Hungary implemented yoyo like changes by increasing the rates in 2004, and 
decreasing them in early 2006, while again implementing a rise later in the same year. 
Popular wisdom holds that while tax increases are almost fully transmitted onto consumer prices, tax 
reductions only partially feed into consumer prices. It is therefore interesting to study the extent to 
which changes in VAT rates influence inflation rates in the EU after 1996. Tables 8a and 8b 
summarise VAT rate hikes or cuts after 1996 and their impact on the HICP one month and two months 
after the change took place. Notwithstanding the caveats of such an exercise
35, changes in the VAT 
rate turn out to have an effect on the inflation rate. The second and somewhat more puzzling result is 
that variations in VAT rates bring about less than proportionate changes in the inflation rates, 
irrespective of the direction of the change in the VAT rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 In the old EU-15 countries, standard VAT rates were increased progressively from around 10% in the 1970s to the 
neighbourhood of 20% nowadays, increasing inevitably the overall price level. However, new member states started 
economic transition in the early 1990s with already high standard VAT rates. Cyprus is an exception as it increased the rate 
from 5% in 1992 to 15% in 2003.  
34 Different tax rates can also bring about differences in service prices. 
35 There are two drawbacks. First, it is difficult to assess the overall effect of VAT rate changes in the presence of reduced 
and super reduced rate because of the lack of information to what proportion of the items in the HICP they are applied. 
Changes in the VAT rates could be also accompanied by a regrouping of items in standard, reduced and super-reduced rates. 
Second, looking at changes disregarding the development of the economic fundamentals can provide us only with an 
approximate measure.   29
Figure 12. Reduced and Standard VAT Rates in Europe, 2006. 
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Source: European Commission (DG Taxation and Customs Union) 
 
Table 8a. The Unconditional Effect of Changes in VAT Rates on the HICP, 1996-2006. 
M-o-M change in the HICP 
1M before 1M after 2M after Country Date  Old and new 
VAT rates 
Impact 
on prices the change in the VAT rate 
Direction 
of change 
Size 
of change
Belgium  01/01/2000  RR: 1/6/12 -> 6  ???  0.5%  -0.3%  0.8%     
France  01/04/2000  SR: 20.6 ->19.6  -0.8%  0.3%  0.0%  0.1%  YES  LESS 
Germany  01/04/1998  SR: 15 ->16  0.9%  -0.1%  0.2%  0.3%  YES  LESS 
Greece  01/04/2005  RR: 4/4.5 -> 8/9 
SR:18 ->19 
0.5% 
0.8% 
0.2% 0.4%  0.3% YES  LESS 
Finland  01/01/1998  RR: 6/12/17 -> 8/17 Increase? 0.1%  0.3%  -0.2%  YES  ??? 
Ireland  01/01/2001  RR: 4.2 -> 4.3 
SR: 21 -> 20 
0.1% 
-0.8% 
-0.3% -0.1% 0.4%  NO  LESS 
Ireland  01/03/2002  SR: 20 -> 21  0.8%  0.1%  0.6%  0.5%  YES  LESS 
Italy  01/10/1997  SR: 19 ->20  0.8%  0.2%  0.3%  0.2%  YES  LESS 
Netherlands  01/01/2001  SR: 17.5 -> 19  1.3%  0.2%  1.0%  0.5%  YES  OK 
Portugal  05/06/2002  SR: 17 -> 19  1.7%  0.4%  0.3%  0.4%  NO   
Portugal  01/07/2005  SR: 19 -> 21  1.7%  0.0%  0.6%  0.4%  YES  LESS 
UK  01/09/1997  RR: 8 -> 5  -2.8%  0.3%  0.0%  0.2%  YES   
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Notes: RR and SR refer to the reduced and the standard VAT rate, respectively. The column “impact on prices” gives the 
change on prices implied automatically by changes in the VAT rates. The column “direction of change” indicates whether the 
observed unconditional change after the change in the VAT rate is in line with the change in the VAT rate. The column “size 
of chang” shows whether the size of the observed unconditional change after the change in the VAT rate is roughly in line 
with the size of the change in the VAT rate. Belgium: the reduced rates of 1 percent, 6 percent and 12  percent were replace 
by a single rate of 6 percent. Hence, it is difficult to assess the overall impact (increase or decrease) without having detailed 
information on the distribution of items across the three rates. Ireland: Reduced rates were changed on six other occasions in 
Ireland. These event are not reported first because changes were very small, ranging between 0.1 and 0.5 percentage points 
and second because no tangible effect of these changes can be observed in the data. 
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Table 8b. The Unconditional Effect of Changes in VAT Rates on the HICP, 1996-2006. 
M-o-M change in the HICP 
1M before 1M after 2M after Country Date Old and new 
VAT rates 
Impact 
on prices
the change in the VAT rate 
Direction 
of change 
Size 
of change
Czech Rep.  29/04/2004  SR: 22 -> 19  -2.5%  0.1%  0.5%  0.0%  NO   
Estonia 01/01/2000  RR:  intr  5  -11% 1.0% 0.0%  -0.1% YES   
Hungary  01/01/2004  RR: 0/12 -> 5/15 Increase  0.4%  1.5%  0.7%  YES   
Hungary  01/01/2006  SR: 25 ->20  -4.0%  0.2%  -0.8%  0.0%  YES  LESS 
Latvia 01/01/2003  RR:  intr  9  -7.6%  0.4%  0.2%  0.3%  YES   
Latvia  01/05/2004  RR. 9 -> 5  -3.7%  0.5%  0.9%  0.7%  YES   
Lithuania 01/05/2000  RR:  intr  5  -11%  0.1%  -0.3%  0.4%  YES   
Lithuania  01/01/2001  RR. 5 -> 5/9  3.8%  0.2%  -0.3%  0.2%  NO   
Slovenia  01/01/2002  RR: 8 -> 8.5 
SR: 19 -> 20 
0.5% 
0.8% 
0.2% 1.4%  0.6% YES MORE 
Slovakia 01/07/1999  RR:  6->10  3.8%  0.9%  5.9% 0.7%  YES  MORE 
Slovakia  01/01/2003  RR: 10 -> 14 
SR: 23 -> 20 
??? 0.7%  3.3%  0.2%     
Slovakia  01/01/2004  One rate: 19  increase? 0.6%  2.3%  0.3%  YES   
Cyprus 01/07/2000  RR:  intr  5 
SR: 8 -> 10 
-2.8% 
1.9% 
-0.4% 0.7% 0.0%     
Cyprus  01/07/2002  SR: 10 -> 13  2.7%  0.7%  0.6%  0.7%  NO   
Cyprus  01/01/2003  SR: 13 -> 15  1.8%  0.7%  1.0%  0.7%  YES  LESS 
Cyprus  01/01/2006  RR: 5 -> 5/8  2.9%  0.0%  0.0%  0.3%  NO   
Malta 01/01/2004  15  ->18  2.6%  0.5%  0.3%  0.0%  NO   
Source: Author’s calculations 
Notes: See Table 8a. 
 
7. External Factors and Economic Structures 
7.1 Oil Prices 
We have seen that differences in the price of fuel are mainly a result of different tax rates and thus 
price level convergence is purely a question of tax harmonisation. Nevertheless, changes in oil prices 
may influence countries very differently on two grounds. The first reason can be found in differences 
in the position in the business cycle. Oil price increases are more easily and quickly passed through to 
consumer prices during periods of strong economic conditions than during times of slow growth. 
Consequently, a given rise in the price of oil will affect inflation rates differently, if business cycles 
are not synchronised across countries. 
The second reason is more structural. Despite profound economic restructuring and modernisation, the 
economies of the former Eastern bloc remain very oil intensive. The most oil intensive economies, like 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Romania need six to nine times more oil to produce the same amount 
of GDP than Western European countries, although these figures almost halved from 1991 to 2004. 
And even the most oil efficient transition economies such as Slovenia and Croatia consume at least 
twice the amount of oil per unit of GDP than their Western counterparts. In addition, the transition 
economies (except for the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia) import considerably more oil per 
unit of GDP than the euro area average, as evidenced by Figure 13b. Nevertheless, this picture needs 
to be viewed with some caution given that these calculations are based on GDP figures converted at 
current market exchange rates to the euro. The use of PPP exchange rates would result higher GDP 
figures, which in turn would reduce the oil intensity of the countries under study. 
The implications are twofold. First, a rise in the price of oil has a larger impact on production costs. 
Consequently, producer prices are bound to increase faster than in the euro area, which may fuel 
domestic inflation for domestically produced and consumed goods and it also causes losses in 
competitiveness and a deterioration of the trade balance. A correction of the trade balance could then 
lead to a nominal depreciation, which, in a second round, will lead to higher imported and thus overall 
inflation. There is also a direct feedback to the consumer price index, which is determined by the share 
of fuel products in the HICP, and from a broader perspective, the share of energy products (including 
heating oil and gas, the price of which are related to oil price movements) in the HICP. While fuel 
accounts for a similar proportion of the HICP in the transition economies and in the euro area (with the   31
exception of Estonia and Slovenia), energy items represent a 40 percent to 100 percent larger chunk of 
the HICP in the transition economies when compared to the euro area average (see Figure 17c). 
Clearly, transition economies would react with higher inflation rates to hikes in energy prices. 
However, real catching-up also bears further economic restructuring and a convergence of economic 
structures, which would entail a further fall in oil intensity and in the share of energy in the HICP and 
in more synchronisation of the reactions to changes in oil prices. 
 
Figure 13a. Oil intensity of the economies, 1991 and 2004 (current prices) 
Energy intensity of the economy (euro area level = 1)
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Source: Author’s calculations using NewCronos/Eurostat data. 
 
Figure 13b. Energy dependency, 2004 
Energy dependency (net energy imports measured as ton equivalent petrol over GDP in euro)
euro area price level = 1, 2004
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Source: Author’s calculations using NewCronos/Eurostat data. 
 
Figure 13c. Share of fuel and total energy in the HICP, 2006 
Share of fuel and total energy items in the HICP (euro area price level = 1), 2006
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Source: Author’s calculations using NewCronos/Eurostat data (3-digit COICOP disaggregation of the HICP). 
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7.2 The Exchange Rate 
7.2.1 The Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
The exchange rate pass-through is one of the channels through which exchange rate changes could 
generate asymmetric responses in inflation rates. The first obvious asymmetry exists between euro 
area countries and the transition economies because exchange rate pass-through matters much less for 
the euro area than for the transition economies. What really matters for euro area countries is the 
euro/dollar exchange rate and their extra euro area openness whilst exchange rate pass-through is 
potentially important for the entire foreign trade of the transition economies (except for those with 
currency board arrangement vis-à-vis the euro, like Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania). 
A second asymmetry pointed out for instance by Lane and Honohen (2004) regards the euro area itself 
given differences in the degree of extra euro area openness across member states. 
Finally, differences in inflation rates brought about by exchange rate developments could be 
potentially larger across transition economies than within the euro area for a number of reasons. On 
one hand, changes in the exchange rate faced by individual economies are simply different due to 
different exchange rate arrangements (peg, managed or free floating) and due to diverging 
developments of the economic factors affecting the exchange rate, which may or may not reflect 
differences in the business cycle position. On the other hand, even though the exchange rate, whether 
the rate against the euro or the effective exchange rate, moved the same amount in all transition 
economies, the outcome on prices would be different because the size of the exchange rate pass-
through differs across countries. 
Let us now turn to the factors determining the size of the exchange rate pass-through and summarise 
the estimation results available for transition economies. There is indeed a substantial amount of 
research dealing with the question of how the exchange rate influences domestic prices. The starting 
point is how firms set the prices of imported goods. If the prices of imported goods are set in the local 
currency (local or consumer currency prices, LCP), the exchange rate will have zero impact on prices 
(zero pass-through). By contrast, if the price of an imported good is set in the exporting country’s 
currency (producer currency pricing - PCP), any change in the exchange rate will be immediately 
reflected in the price of the given good (complete pass-through).  
The exchange rate pass-through could cause consumer prices to change via imported goods in the 
consumer basket and also through imported intermediate goods affecting, firstly, producer prices and 
then consumer prices. Even though the pass-through is complete for imported goods, there are good 
reasons to think that the pass-through would be lower for producer prices and even lower for consumer 
prices. First, final consumer prices include the costs of wholesaling and retailing (including 
transportation, marketing and advertisement and, importantly, wage costs), which are less sensitive to 
exchange rate movements and thus create a buffer between prices and the exchange rate. Second, final 
products may be a combination of imported and domestic goods. While PCP may apply to the 
imported intermediate good, the pass-through will be lower than unity because of the domestic goods 
component. 
There are two widely accepted observations regarding the pass-through. The exchange rate pass-
through is generally found to be higher in developing and emerging market economies than in more 
established market economies. At the same time, the exchange rate pass-through was declining in most 
of the countries over time. A first strand of the literature stresses the importance of the macroeconomic 
factors, in particular inflation rates (Taylor, 2000). The higher inflation is, the higher the exchange rate 
pass-through is thought to be because in a high inflationary environment, prices are adjusted more 
frequently. This implies that exchange rate changes can be incorporate into prices more quickly. 
Hence, higher pass-through in developing countries can be explained by chronically higher inflation 
rates. At the same time, the magnitude of the pass-through has declined over time because of 
decreasing inflation rates both in developing and developed countries.  
Another body of the literature argues that what is crucial for the size of the pass-through is the 
composition of imports (Campa and Goldberg, 2002). This literature points out that the pass-through is 
higher for homogenous goods, while it is lower for differentiated goods, where there is more scope for   33
pricing-to-market practices. As a result, poorer countries that import more homogenous goods face 
higher pass-through than richer countries where the share of manufactured goods in total imports is 
higher. In addition to that, a shift in the composition of imports towards more differentiated goods 
occurs with economic development. Hence, catching-up countries may see an increase in the exchange 
rate pass-through. 
Nevertheless, Frankel, Parsley and Wei (2005) cast some doubt on the role this so-called composition 
effect plays in the size of the pass-through as they find that the pass-through for very homogenous 
goods such as Marlboro cigarettes, Coca-cola, Cognac, Gilbey’s gin, Time magazine, Kodak colour 
film, Cointreau liqueur and Martini&Rossi Vermouth is much lower at the docks in the US than much 
of the rest of the World.  
Expectations are another important factor determining the importance of the pass-through. Generally, 
the pass-through is higher if changes in the exchange rate are perceived as permanent rather than 
temporary. However, and more importantly, exchange rates are or were frequently used in transition 
economies to provide a nominal anchor for inflationary expectations. If the exchange rate is a credible 
anchor for instance in a crawling peg or band type of arrangement, then changes in the exchange rate 
will be quickly incorporated into expectations and, consequently, into (both tradable and non-tradable) 
prices. By contrast, the exchange rate should not be strongly associated with the exchange rate in an 
inflation targeting framework, where expectations are anchored down by credibly communicated 
inflation target. In such a framework, the pass-through is low because of the disconnect between non-
tradable prices and the exchange rate. 
Both inflation rates and the composition effect seem to go in the direction of a reduced exchange rate 
pass-through in most transition economies (Table 9). From the viewpoint of the macroeconomic 
environment, inflation rates decreased substantially between 1997 and 2005, with very large drops in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The composition effect, measured as the share of 
manufactured goods and machinery and transport equipment in total imports in 2005, also suggest low 
pass-through given a very large share of differentiated goods in most countries. In addition, this share 
rose substantially in all countries but Slovenia. 
At the same time, the long-run exchange rate pass-through coefficients allow us to see the effect of 
different monetary policy and exchange rate regimes on the pass-through. The pass-through is the 
lowest in the Czech Republic where direct inflation targeting and float exchange rates have a long 
track record. It tends to be higher in Hungary, Romania and Slovenia, where the exchange rate has 
been an intermediary target of the monetary policy. 
 
Table 9. Long-Run Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Transition Economies 
 CPI  ∆CPI COMPOSITION
EFFECT 
EXCHANGE RATE 
PASS-THROUGH 
  %  %  LEVEL CHANGE To IMPORT To PPI  To CPI 
Czech Rep  1.6 -6.4  73.8  +20.1  0.65  0.41  0.23 
Hungary  3.5 -15.0  77.3  +19.4  0.87  0.57  0.30 
Poland  2.1 -12.8  67.7  +12.4  0.84  0.60  0.31 
Slovakia  2.8 -3.2  69.1  +30.9  1.01  0.73  0.35 
Slovenia  2. -5.9  67.5  +5.5  0.40  0.78  0.53 
Estonia  4.2 -5.1      0.83  0.47  0.35 
Latvia  7.0 -1.1      0.45  0.66  0.39 
Lithuania  2.7 -7.6      0.32  0.55  0.32 
Bulgaria  5.0 -13.8  60.2  +20.3  --  0.94  0.68 
Croatia  3.3 -2.4  66.5  +22.2  --  0.17  0.22 
Romania (EFF/EUR)  9.1 -146.9  68.6  +24.0  --  0.48  0.21 
Romania (USD)         --  0.53  0.42 
Source: Exchange rate pass-through estimates come from Coricelli, Égert and MacDonald (2006). 
Notes: The CPI figures refer to 2005, and ∆CPI is the difference between average annual inflation in 2005 and in 1997. For 
Bulgaria and Croatia, the difference is calculated for 2005 and 1998. The level of the composition effect is given as the share 
of manufactured goods and machinery and transport equipment in total imports in 2005. The change indicates the change 
from the early 1990s to 2005. Figures for the long-run exchange rate pass-through are averages obtained on the basis of 
available long-run pass-through estimates from the literature. The averages are based on non-negative pass-through estimates. 
Negative pass-through estimates were set to zero.   34
7.2.2 Trend Nominal Appreciation – Equivalence or Fallacy? 
As we have seen, the influence of the exchange rate on domestic inflation is slowing down in the 
transition economies. Hence, a given change in the exchange rate is not reflected in a correspondingly 
high change in the inflation rate. In contrast to this stands the role of the exchange rate on price levels 
since for instance an appreciation of the exchange rate will increase the price level of the transition 
economies expressed in euros. This increase will be immediate and full in the very short-run. In the 
longer term, the impact depends inversely on the strength of the exchange rate pass-through. A lower 
pass-through will imply that a nominal appreciation or depreciation would cause a more important 
increase or decrease in the price level expressed in euros. 
It is worthwhile pausing in this context on the equivalence advocated by numerous economists 
between price level convergence caused by higher productivity-driven inflation rates (Balassa-
Samuelson) and price level convergence due to the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. In the 
standard Balassa-Samuelson framework, PPP holds for tradables, so the change in the price level 
comes as an increase in non-tradable prices due to productivity gains in the tradable sector. In the case 
of nominal appreciation, a rise in the price level comes once again from the rise in the price level of 
non-tradables due to the nominal appreciation, while the prices of tradables remain constant in the 
foreign currency given that PPP holds. 
Nevertheless, if we consider this equivalence more in depth, it quickly turns into a fallacy. Because of 
the incomplete pass-through to tradable goods, PPP fails to hold for tradable goods and the failure of 
PPP implies that the real exchange rate of the open sector appreciates. This has two implications. First, 
an appreciation, which is needed to produce the size of a price level convergence, which equals the 
one due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect (non-tradable prices) leads to a more pronounced increase in 
the price level, because the price level of the tradable goods also rises. Second, it worsens 
competitiveness as the real exchange rate of the tradable goods appreciates. This stands in contrast to 
the B-S effect, which is competitiveness neutral and where price level convergence comes only 
through non-tradables. 
The equivalence might be extended to the whole price level because we have seen that tradable goods 
are also a source of price level convergence. This means that real convergence may also entail an 
increase in the price level of tradable goods, thanks to a shift to better quality goods and perhaps also 
to pricing-to-market practices. Now, the question is whether these price increases are fully equivalent 
to a nominal appreciation. The answer is clearly no for two reasons. From a consumer viewpoint, a 
nominal appreciation raises the price level of both poor and better quality goods, while this is not the 
case if price level convergence comes via a mismeasurement of a shift towards high price goods. From 
the perspective of exporting firms, nominal appreciation worsens the competitiveness of the very same 
good, while competitiveness is not affected if prices increase because of better quality.  
Nevertheless, nominal appreciation could be sustained for some time. In particular, high mark-up 
sectors could react by squeezing profits. In addition, firms which have large foreign currency 
denominated liabilities could compensate by narrowing margins via the decrease in their debt’s value 
in domestic currency terms (balance sheet effect). 
Yet, price level convergence coming exclusively from a nominal trend appreciation could mean a 
bumpy road. First, low mark-up sectors will loose out very quickly. Second, even for high mark-up 
sectors, mark-ups will be squeezed to zero and/or prices on the exports markets will increase leading 
to losses in market shares at some point. This hollows out the export sector, which is the main engine 
of real convergence in transition economies. Also, domestic input prices, like rents, market and non-
market services and, importantly, wages would increase in foreign currency terms. Even though this 
could be compensated by a drop in the price of imported inputs, such increases could prompt the 
reallocation of economic activity to cheaper locations. 
7.3 Business Cycle Synchronisation 
The output gap is usually viewed as an important determinant of inflation rates (see e.g. Lane and 
Honohen, 2004; Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2004 and Hofmann and Rembsperger, 2005, for euro area 
countries and Rogers, 2001, 2002, more generally). However, the link between output gaps and   35
inflation rates is not that obvious as shown in Figure 14 below because some items such as regulated 
prices and the prices of those goods that are strongly influenced by external factors may be not 
connected to domestic output gaps. Indeed, the European Commission (2006) shows that headline 
inflation is less correlated with the output gap than a number of hand-picked goods and services. This 
phenomenon is also demonstrated by Chmielewski and Kot (2006) for the case of Poland. 
 
Figure 14. Output gaps and inflation rates (HICP) in selected countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: AMECO Database. 
Note: The output gap is calculated as the gap between actual and trend gross domestic product at 2000 market prices. 
 
If we assume that output gaps and inflation rates are related,, inflation rates may differ across countries 
thanks to differences in output gaps, i.e. the position in the business cycles. The literature on optimal 
currency areas deals extensively with the question of how business cycles can become more 
synchronised if the exchange rate is fixed. Factor mobility, labour market flexibility, trade openness 
and similar economic structures figure on the wish-list. 
A relatively recent argument, which elaborates more on similar economic structures, says that intra-
industry trade is a key determinant of business cycle harmonisation (Frankel and Rose, 1998). The 
higher the share of openness and the more important the share of intra-industry trade in total trade 
flows, the stronger the synchronisation of  business cycles because a slowdown or acceleration in a 
given sector will equally affect both countries. Also, Frankel and Rose (1998) argue that intraindustry 
trade would secure endogenously business cycle synchronisation. Business cycles may be less 
correlated today, but if the share of intraindustry trade in total trade is high enough, business cycles 
will become synchronised in the future. 
Finally, fiscal policy has recently been found to have a strong impact on business cycle fluctuation. 
Darvas, Rose and Szapáry (2005) demonstrate for the case of 21 OECD countries that higher fiscal 
convergence in terms of the government’s budget position tends to be linked to higher business cycle 
synchronisation. 
A large number of studies sought to determine the degree of business cycle synchronisation within the 
euro area on the one hand, and between the euro area and the transition economies on the other. 
Regarding business cycle synchronisation between transition economies and the euro area, the 
empirical results indicate a substantial amount of heterogeneity across countries. For instance, Darvas 
and Szapáry (2005) find that Hungary, Poland and Slovenia are the countries with the highest degree 
of synchronisation concerning GDP, industry and exports, while the Baltic countries, the Czech 
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Republic and Slovakia exhibit less co-movement with the euro area business cycle. This result is 
confirmed in a meta-analysis by Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006), which actually summarises the results 
of 35 papers. The result is not very surprising in the light of the evolution of intraindustry trade as a 
share of total trade. As shown in Figure 15, intraindustry trade in total trade rose sharply from 1989 to 
2001 in the Central and Eastern European countries. Hungary, Poland and Slovenia are the ones with 
the highest shares.  
However, some qualifications are of order. First, the share of intraindustry trade in total trade is still 
lower in these three countries than in core euro area countries. As a result, Eickmeier and Breitung 
(2006) find that transition economies are less correlated with the euro area than core euro area 
countries among them. Second, despite very high intraindustry trade, the Czech Republic is only 
weakly correlated with euro area business cycle, most probably because the 1997 currency crisis and 
the following economic recession dominates the short sample. Nevertheless, the endogeneity argument 
would lead to more synchronisation in the future. Third, the case for the Baltic countries is less sure 
because of the low share intraindustry trade in total trade. 
 
Figure 15. Intra-industry Trade with the EU-15 in 1989 and 2001 
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Source: Djablik and Fidrmuc (2004) 
 
If we take seriously the argument about fiscal position and business cycle synchronisation, we would 
think, based on Figure 16 below, that fiscal policy would matter a lot in this respect both within the 
euro area and also between the euro area and the transition economies. Less correlation between core 
euro area countries and economies on the periphery could be a result of high public deficits in Greece 
and Portugal and large surpluses in Finland and Ireland. Transition countries that have higher 
intraindustry trade with the euro area tend to record higher public deficits than the Baltic states. These 
differences could compensate if not offset completely each other’s impact on business cycle 
correlation. 
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Figure 16. Consolidated balance of the general government (% of GDP), 2000 to 2005 
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Source: NewCronos/Eurostat. General government’s net lending (+) net borrowing (-) under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
 
8. The Mismatch between Price Level Convergence and 
Inflation Differentials 
Thus far, we have attempted to illustrate, where appropriate, how structural and cyclical factors may 
impact differently on price level convergence and on inflation differentials, i.e. why inflation 
differentials are not necessary a synonym for price level convergence and vice versa. In this section, 
these differences are put forth more explicitly and summarised in Figure 17. Let us start with the long-
term factor. First, the influence of the long-term nominal exchange rate trends hinges on the strength 
of the exchange rate pass-through. If the exchange rate pass-through is complete, exchange rate 
changes will fully show-up in inflation rates, but will have no consequence on relative price levels. In 
contrast, if the pass-through is weak, exchange rate changes will have little influence on the inflation 
rate but will move up or down the relative price level. 
Second, the weights attributed to different items are comparable in price level comparison while they 
depend on final household expenditure for the inflation rate. As a result, major difference in 
consumption patterns will be reflected in different weights. The upshot of this is that price level 
convergence can happen with less than corresponding inflation rates and that higher inflation rates do 
not necessarily cause a corresponding convergence in price levels. For the first, let us consider the 
share of market prices. As their share in the consumer basket is lower in the transition economies than 
in euro area countries, a Balassa-Samuelson type of increase would lead to lower inflation rates in 
transition economies, but it will cause a levelling of price levels. Energy prices, which are more 
important in the transition economies’ HICP than in the euro area countries’ HICP, stand in contrast to 
this. Hence, increases in energy prices will lead to higher inflation but to less price level convergence 
in transition economies. 
Third, changes in quality and the introduction of new goods should not matter for inflation rates given 
that they are assumed to be corrected for these two factors (even though this is not exactly the case in 
practice). By contrast, the collection of data on price levels, carried out at low frequencies (typically 
every 3 years) does not ensure the comparability of the data over time. As a result, the effect of new 
higher-price goods or of better quality goods will not be filtered out from the data and will result in 
higher price levels. 
Finally, house prices feed into inflation rates only indirectly via rents. Here again, the overall impact 
crucially depends on the share of rents in the HICP, which can vary substantially across countries. By 
contrast, house prices show up both directly (via house prices) and indirectly (via rents) in the price 
level data that one can observe in practice. Nevertheless, these pieces of information seem to be 
lacking from official statistics such as those provided by Eurostat and national statistical offices, 
which do not encompass house prices and rents. 
Coming now to the short-term factors such as business cycle fluctuations, seasonality or exchange rate 
fluctuations, it is clear that these factors are important for inflation developments but less so for price 
level convergence.   38
Figure 17. Differences and Similarities of Factors Affecting Price Level Convergence and Inflation 
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9. Decomposing Inflation Developments 
9.1. Evidence from an Accounting Framework 
In this section, we first analyse the prices of the most important categories of the HICP, namely 
energy, food, services including regulated services and rents, relative to the price of (non-energy) 
goods (including durable, semi-durable and non-durable goods). We then study the contribution of the 
main categories to the overall inflation rate. For this purpose, we use a simple accounting framework, 
where the average annual contributions are calculated as the average annual growth rate of a given 
category multiplied by its share in the HICP and compared to overall inflation. 
Regarding relative price developments, some general observations can be drawn from Table 10 
presenting averages for 1996 to 2005 and 2001 to 2006
36. First, the relative price of energy increased 
faster in transition economies than in the euro area, notwithstanding large dispersion within the euro 
area (1 percent in Italy and close to 6 percent in the Netherlands). Second, while the relative price of 
services also tends to rise faster in transition economies (with the exception of Latvia, Poland and 
Romania) than in the euro area (except for Ireland), regulated services and rents, which are parts of 
overall services, grew at even higher rates in most of the transition economies (except in Slovenia) but 
remained more in line with overall service prices in the euro area (except for Ireland). Finally, relative 
price adjustments for foodstuff are comparable or even lower in transition economies than in euro area 
countries. 
Notwithstanding these observations, service price inflation contributes only to 20 percent to 40 percent 
of the HICP in transition economies, while the range goes from 30 percent to 70 percent in euro area 
countries. An exception is the Czech Republic with services contributing to nearly 70 percent of the 
HICP. In addition to this, regulated services account for around 1/3 to 1/2 of service price inflation in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and to a much lesser extent in the euro area except for Finland, Germany 
and Ireland. By contrast, rents barely have any effect on the inflation rate in the transition economies, 
whereas they represent up to 15 percent of the HICP in the euro area. 
In contrast to services, price increases in energy and foodstuffs clearly make up a larger chunk of the 
HICP in Central and Eastern Europe than in the euro area, with the contributions ranging from 20 
percent to 50 percent against 10 percent to 30 percent for energy and from 20 percent to 50 percent 
against 20 percent to 30 percent for foodstuffs.  
Finally, the importance of goods inflation for overall inflation appears comparable, even though cross-
country heterogeneity within the country groups is again fairly high. 
                                                 
36 For some countries, only data for the subperiod are available. For Estonia and Hungary, disaggregated data for the main 
components of the HICP are available on from 2002 to 2005.   40
Table 10. Accounting Framework: inflation in Europe 
      Relative prices to that of industrial goods Respective contribution to the inflation rate (in %)
   Inflation 
(HICP)  energy food    services    goods energy food    services   
          all  reg serv.  rents        all  reg serv.  rents 
euro area  1996-2005 1.9  3.0  1.3  1.5  0.9  1.1  14  17  23  46  7  7 
 2001-2005 2.2  2.9  1.9  1.7  2.1  1.0  12  15  25  48  11  5 
Austria 1996-2005 1.5  2.9  1.5  2.1  3.0  2.8  4 16  18  63  14 9 
 2001-2005 1.9  2.7  1.8  2.2  3.3  2.8  6  12  19  62  15  6 
Belgium 1996-2005 1.8  3.1  1.2  1.3 0.2 1.1  14 23 24  40  3  6 
 2001-2005 2.0  2.4  1.4  1.1  -0.4  1.0  17  18  25  40  2  7 
Germany 1996-2005 1.3  4.5 1.3  1.3 2.7  1.1 4  34 19  45  19  10 
 2001-2005 1.6  4.7  2.1  1.5  2.6  0.9  3  29  23  46  18  8 
Luxembourg 1996-2005 2.4  3.8  2.3  1.6  1.7  1.6  15  20  32  34  5  5 
 2001-2005 2.8  3.1  3.1  1.8  1.9  1.2  14  17  39  33  5  3 
Netherlands 1996-2005 2.5  5.6  1.1  2.1  3.0  2.1  12  24  16  48  15  12 
 2001-2005 2.8  5.8  1.3  2.8  3.6  1.9  10  21  14  54  17  8 
Ireland 1996-2005 3.2  5.0  3.4  4.8  7.1  5.0  -1  14  28  60  18 4 
 2001-2005 3.4  5.0  2.8  5.2  7.5  3.6  1  12  21  69  20  3 
Finland 1996-2005 1.5 3.0  0.7  2.1  3.0  2.5  6 19  15  60  18 12 
 2001-2005 1.4  2.5  0.5  2.0  3.0  2.5  7  15  13  68  23  15 
Italy 1996-2005 2.3  1.2  0.4  1.1  1.1  1.6  26  9  19  46  7  4 
 2001-2005 2.4  1.0  1.3  1.2  1.2  0.8  24  7  24  46  7  3 
Greece 1996-2005 3.6  0.8  1.2  2.0  2.1  2.4  23 7  27  45  11 5 
 2001-2005 3.5  1.9  1.4  1.5  2.0  2.2  22  8  26  44  14  4 
Portugal 1996-2005 2.8 2.4  0.8  2.5 3.2 1.1  18 12 21  49 11  2 
 2001-2005 3.2  3.4  0.6  2.4  3.3  0.8  18  14  17  50  12  2 
Spain 1996-2005 2.8  1.7  1.5  2.1  2.1  2.8  18  10  29  45  7  3 
 2001-2005 3.2  1.4  2.6  2.3  2.3  2.6  15  8  33  44  7  3 
France 1996-2005 1.6  2.5  2.2  1.6  1.8  1.7  6  15  34  45  10 8 
 2001-2005 2.0  2.2  2.5  2.0  1.9  2.0  8  11  31  50  11  8 
                          
Denmark 1996-2005 1.9  3.8 0.9  2.6 2.6  2.2 6  23 14  56  13  11 
 2001-2005 1.9  2.3  0.4  2.5  3.5  2.0  10  17  11  61  21  11 
Sweden 1996-2005 1.5 4.7  1.7  2.5  2.2  2.2  -7 35  20  53 8  14 
 2001-2005 1.7  5.8  1.4  2.6  2.3  2.6  -3  37  14  53  8  14 
UK 1996-2005 1.4  5.7  3.9  5.9  5.3  5.0  -48  17  22  109  19  10 
 2001-2005 1.5  5.7  4.1  6.2  7.1  5.0  -51  13  19  119  32  9 
                          
Cyprus 1996-2005 2.7  8.4  4.8  3.3  5.1  3.3  -3  24  41  36  12 1 
 2002-2005 2.7  12.5  6.6  4.5  7.2  4.9  -18  33  44  40  18  1 
Malta 1996-2005 2.8  5.4  2.3  3.3  3.8  0.6  9  11  25  56  9  0 
 2001-2005 2.4  5.1  2.3  3.0  3.9  0.7  7  11  26  57  10  0 
                          
Czech Rep.  2001-2005 2.0  5.5  2.4  5.4  6.1  5.0  -14  29  19  67  16  8 
Estonia 2002-2005 3.0  7.2  1.8  3.4  5.7  2.9  5 35  25  37  15 2 
Hungary 2002-2005 5.1  4.2  2.1  4.6 6.1 5.7  14  18 26  42 12  0 
Latvia 1996-2005 4.2  2.3  -0.1  2.0  2.1  7.2  20  19  32  31  12  5 
 2001-2005 4.1  2.8  2.4  0.8  2.5  2.2  17  17  45  22  11  1 
Lithuania 1996-2005 2.6  7.3 0.2  4.7  5.4 11.9 7  45  15  39  15  2 
 2001-2005 0.9  3.9  2.6  3.6  4.5  4.8  -35  37  50  49  21  1 
Poland 1996-2005 6.4  3.6  -0.4  2.8  3.9  7.7  23  21  27  31  10 7 
 2001-2005 2.7  3.6  0.4  1.6  3.4  3.8  17  30  25  31  15  8 
Slovakia 2001-2005 5.9  9.3  2.0  7.2  10.0  15.2  8  31 18  44 14  4 
Slovenia 2001-2005 5.6  4.7  1.8  4.0 2.9 5.2  17  18 22  42  9  3 
                          
Bulgaria 1996-2005 7.3  7.5  -0.9  10.2  14.8  21.8  16 27 28  34 17  1 
 2001-2005 5.3  4.5  -0.1  2.1  4.2  1.5  17  26  35  23  12  0 
Romania 2002-2005 14.7 10.3  0.7  2.5 8.5 3.8  17  30 40  14  12  0 
Turkey 1996-2005 47.7  4.6  1.5  6.1  6.5  8.6  28  12  33  27  11 6 
 2001-2005 29.5  7.1  1.6  2.0  2.8  1.4  27  15  32  26  11  5 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Note: Relative prices to those of industrial goods are obtained as average annual inflation rate of a given subcategory over the 
average annual inflation rate of industrial goods. The respective contribution to the inflation rate is computed as the average 
annual inflation rate of a subcategory multiplied by its share in the CPI divided by the average annual inflation rate. 
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9.2. Econometric Evidence 
9.2.1 Data Description and Preliminary Data Analysis 
We now proceed to test econometrically the relative importance of the factors analysed thus far and 
regress yearly domestic inflation rates (HICP) on a set of yearly structural, cyclical and external 
factors for three groups of countries, namely 1.) the euro area excluding Luxembourg, 2.) transition 
economies (CEE-10) including the CEE-5, the three Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania and 3.) 
the euro area and the CEE-10. The tests are carried out for the period from 1996 to 2005. The choice 
of the period is given by the availability of the HICP data. We also investigate the period after the 
launch of the euro, i.e. from 1999 to 2005. 
We use six blocks of variables in an attempt to cover comprehensively the determinants of inflation 
rates. The first block focuses on cyclical factors. Two output gap measures 
37 - both obtained from the 
European Commission -, the rate of growth of unit labour costs and the consolidated balance of the 
general government as a share of GDP are used to capture the influence of cyclical factors on the 
inflation rate.  
The second and third blocks focus on structural factors. In the second block, the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect is analysed in two different ways. First, the narrow and the wide estimates of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect from column 6 and 7 of Table 3 are used along the lines of Hofmann and 
Remsperger (2005). In addition to this, time series of the productivity differential between the open 
sector and the market service sector, as computed for Table 3, are also employed. 
The third block of variables deals with other structural factors related to changes in final household 
consumption due to economic catching-up. It is difficult to find good and precise measures of the 
other sources of structural inflation linked to goods prices. Nevertheless, the use of initial price levels 
could provide us with useful – and indirect - insights. Hence, the relative price level of 1997 is used to 
see the extent to which initially different price levels could generate diverging inflation rates. We use a 
number of variables that may reflect changes in the structure of final household consumption. First, 
the growth rate of GDP per capita might be able to capture the shift in private consumption to better 
quality goods and to more services as disposable income increases. Second, the share of food items in 
the HICP basket should be negatively related to a shift towards better quality goods and to more 
services. Third, changes in the share of recreation in the HICP including both goods and services are 
to reflect a similar shift. Finally, the growth rate of final household consumption at constant prices 
might be used as a proxy for demand-side pressures, both for goods and services. 
The fourth block of variables looks at the extent to which regulated prices impact on the inflation rate. 
We use three variables capturing the effect of regulated prices on overall inflation: inflation rates that 
are constructed in accordance with the narrow, intermediate and broad definitions of regulated prices.  
The fifth model concerns external factors, namely changes in the price of crude oil and external 
openness to exchange rate fluctuations. The second variable is obtained as import openness (import of 
goods relative to GDP) multiplied by the nominal effective exchange rate
38. For euro area countries 
and countries with a currency board linked to the euro (Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania), non-euro 
area openness (proxied by extra EU-15 imports) is used, while total import of goods is retained for the 
remaining transition economies. 
The final set of variables covers monetary aggregates, annual changes in M2 and M3 (depending on 
data availability), yearly growth rates in residential house prices and two dummy variables that are 
constructed to measure the effect of increases and decreases in VAT. The variables take the value of 1, 
if there was an increase or decrease in VAT in a given year.
39 
                                                 
37 The first measure is the gap between actual and trend gross domestic product at 2000 market prices (output gap). The 
second measure is the gap between actual and potential gross domestic product at 2000 market prices (output gap2). 
38 An increase (decrease) in the nominal effective exchange rate indicates an appreciation (depreciation). 
39 The source of the output gap, unit labour cost, GDP per capita, final household consumption, openness and the nominal 
effective exchange rate variables are drawn from the AMECO database of the European Commission. Data for the 
productivity differential are constructed as explained earlier in the text. The regulated price series, the share of food and 
recreation activities are constructed using data obtained from Eurostat’s NewCronos database. Monetary aggregates come   42
Finally, in accordance with the general finding of a high inflation persistence in the euro area (see e.g. 
Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2004 and Angeloni, Aucremanne and Ciccarelli, 2006), we also include the 
HICP lagged with one year.  
9.2.2 Estimation Results 
All the data are of annual frequency and are calculated as average yearly growth rates. It is 
nevertheless necessary to check whether or not the data series are stationary. For this purpose, we use 
the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) panel unit root test. Although this test does not allow for country-
specific unit roots, it seems to fit our dataset best given the limited time series dimension of our data 
(10 observations at best), which would made the use of heterogeneous panel unit root tests difficult. 
The results, not reported here, indicate that the null of a unit root can be rejected for all series. The 
results for first- and second-differenced data confirm this finding. 
We follow a general-to-specific model selection strategy to identify blocks of statistically significant 
variables. We first include all variables described above and eliminate the insignificant ones. At the 
end of this procedure, we are left with a parsimonious specification containing only the variables 
which turn out to be statistically significant. The estimations are carried out using Generalised 
Methods of Moment (GMM) because the potential correlation between the lagged dependent variable 
(the inflation rate) with the error terms leads to a bias in the OLS estimator. Lagged values of the 
explanatory variables are used as instruments. Nevertheless, we still use pooled OLS estimators 
because the initial price level and the narrow and wide Balassa-Samuelson measures are indeed 
country constants. 
As noted earlier, two alternative measures for the output gap are employed. Because our dataset on 
house prices does not cover our whole country sample, the inclusion or not of house prices slightly 
changes the country coverage. For this reason, we analyse starting specifications including and 
excluding house prices. Furthermore, the Balassa-Samuelson constants (narrow and wide) and the 
productivity differentials are included always separately and never together in the starting 
specifications. Finally, the series concerning regulated prices usually start around 1998 which leads us 
to include those series only for the second subperiod. 
The estimates, reported in Tables 11 to 14 hereafter, reveal a number of interesting features of the 
determinants of inflation rates in Europe.  
For the euro area, the two most robust variables are inflation persistence measured by means of the 
lagged inflation rate and cyclical fluctuations captures by the two measures of output gap and unit 
labour cost developments (see Table 11). A second set of fairly robust variables includes oil prices and 
regulated prices. Oil prices, while highly significant, are quantitatively negligible as 1% change in oil 
prices leads to a 0.008% increase in the HICP. By contrast, somewhat surprising is the finding that 
regulated prices are not only highly significant but also numerically important with the coefficients 
located around 0.2, when they are included in the equations from 1999 to 2005.  
The other variables are found to be less stable and depend to a great extent on the measure of output 
gap, the time period and the estimation method used. For instance, government deficits turn out to be 
significant with the expected negative sign (an increase in the deficit is related to higher inflation 
rates) only when OLS is used but not for GMM. The same holds true for house prices. In addition, the 
effect of the exchange rate through import openness is not very robust. This stands indeed in contrast 
with the finding of Honohan and Lane (2004), who find the exchange rate variable to be very 
important after the introduction of the euro. Our results may indicate the sensitivity of the estimates to 
the extension of the period used by a couple of years.  
On the other hand, none of the structural factors enter the equations. Both the alternative measures of 
the B-S effect and the battery of proxies aimed at capturing shifts in final household consumption are 
not significant. 
                                                                                                                                                         
from the BIS macroeconomic database for the euro area and from national statistics via the WIIW’s monthly database for 
CEE economies. House prices are obtained from national data sources for selected transition countries (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia) and from the Macroeconomic Database of the BIS for the old 
EU-15 countries (data are not available for Italy). The price of oil is obtained from Datastream (Brent Crude - Physical 
Del.,fob U$/BBL, Datastream code: OILBRNP).   43
For the CEE-10, the results are somewhat different. For this group of countries, the three most robust 
variables are the exchange rate, regulated prices and monetary aggregates. It is not very surprising that 
the exchange rate is important given that this variable is understood in policy circles to have the 
greatest impact on inflation rates in transition economies. Nevertheless, we find that the size of the 
exchange rate pass-through declined on average from around 50% to close to 10%. Regulated prices 
are found to have a comparable impact on inflation than in the euro area. By contrast, the fact that 
monetary aggregates are important in transition economies is truly amazing in light of the 
conventional wisdom that money demand functions tend to be unstable during the process of 
economic transition. There is indeed an abundant literature on the instability of money demand 
functions during the early years of transition. Nonetheless, money demand was found to be stable in 
Hungary and Poland by Buch (2001) and in a panel of six transition economies by Chowdhury and 
Fidrmuc (2004). Our results also suggest that money demand is probably stable for the average of our 
ten transition economies. 
While not unimportant, inflation persistence and the business cycle captured by output gap and unit 
labour cost developments are less robust determinants of inflation rate in transition economies than in 
the euro area. In common with the euro area, regulated prices are a robust determinant of the HICP. 
Furthermore, structural factors do not play a role even in transition economies. This is striking given 
the widespread belief that higher inflation rates in transition economies are mainly due to structural 
factors related to the catching-up process. 
The panel comprising both euro area and transition economies (EU-11 and CEE-10) might offer 
interesting insight because of the larger cross sectional variation of the variables than in the two 
narrower country subsamples. The scenery that opens up before our eyes is very colourful, in 
particular when we look at the period running from 1999 to 2005. The lagged inflation rate, alternative 
output gap measures and regulated prices are all very significant and have large coefficients ranging 
from 0.2 to 0.3. If included in the equation, (increases in) house prices turn out to raise inflation rates, 
even though the overall impact is limited (0.02). Oil price and the exchange rate also matter, although 
they are less robust to different model specifications.  
The major difference to the narrower subsamples is that we are able to establish statistically significant 
relationships between inflation rate and structural factors. This is probably bad news for the 
proponents of the Balassa-Samuelson effect as the coefficients on both the narrow and the wider 
definitions are always negative: higher implied Balassa-Samuelson effects generate lower inflation 
rates. It should be mentioned that the productivity differential variable once again remains silent and 
never enters any of the specifications. This is a clear sign that the Balassa-Samuelson does not matter 
or is at least dominated by other factors. 
On the front of the structural factors capturing shifts in final household consumption,, the news are 
more encouraging if not bright. The price level variable is found to be negatively correlated to the 
inflation rates: lower initial price levels can thus be related to higher inflation rates. All the same, 
growth rates in the GDP per capita variable have a positive influence on the HICP, and a higher share 
of foodstuff in the HICP has a negative link to the inflation rate. This latter finding indicates that a 
decrease in the share of food that is presumed to go in tandem with a move towards higher quality 
goods and more services results in higher inflation rates. Nevertheless, we were not able to establish 
expected positive relationship between the share of recreation activities in the HICP and real final 
household consumption on the one hand, and the inflation on the other.
40 
 
 
                                                 
40 Furthermore, final househould consumption is found to enter the specifications with a 
systematically negative sign. Since we do not have any sensible explanation for this observation, we 
excluded this variable from the estimations. 
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Table 11a. Euro Area (excluding Luxembourg) Dependent variable: annual change in the HICP:  ) (X f P t =  
 
 1996-2005  1999-2005 
  Regulated prices excluded  Regulated prices included 
  House prices included  House prices included    No house prices 
  GMM GMM  OLS  OLS  GMM GMM GMM  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
   CONSTANT      0.441***  0.363***        0.921***  0.781***  2.516*** 0.732***  2.684***  0.898****
   INFLATION (-1)  0.301**  0.622*** 0.622***  0.713***  0.272*** 0.308*** 0.194*  0.502***  0.522***  0.428*** 0.414**** 0.342**** 0.381****
CYCLICAL  FACTORS                 
   OUTPUT GAP1  0.197***   0.245***    0.357***     0.308***  0.306***  0.274*** 0.334**** 0.278***  0.327*** 
   OUTPUT GAP2    0.262***   0.215***    0.253***           
   ULC              0.152*             
   GOV. SURPLUS/DEFICIT      -0.063*** -0.043***                  
BALASSA-SAMUELSON  EFFECT                 
   B-S WIDE (CONST.)      -0.057**  -0.054*        -0.207***     -0.384***     
   B-S NARROW (CONST.)                  -0.178***       -0.337*** 
   PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIAL.                        -1.928***   
REGULATED PRICES                 
   REG1          0.168*  0.139*  0.151**             
   REG2                           
   REG3                      0.215***  0.150***  0.203*** 
OTHER STRUCTURAL FACTORS                 
   SHARE OF RECREATION IN THE HICP                           
   SHARE OF FOOD IN THE HICP                           
   REAL FINAL HOUSHOLD CONSO                           
   PRICE LEVEL 97 (CONST.)                    -1.689**      
   GDP PER CAPITA                           
EXTERNAL FACTORS                 
   OIL PRICE    0.005***                      
   OIL PRICE (-1)  0.012***   0.008***  0.008***  0.007*** 0.009*** 0.011***  0.008***  0.008***  0.008***      
   NEER        -0.058**      -0.052**          
   NEER (-1)                       
OTHER FACTORS                 
   MONETARY AGGREGATES                           
   HOUSE PRICES      0.024***  0.017**        0.022***  0.024***  0.019***      
   VAT INCREASES                           
   VAT DECREASES                           
R2-adj  0.489 0.508 0.758 0.756 0.545  0..492  0.120 0.697 0.686 0.703 0.708  0.710  0.734 
Jarque-Bera normality test (p-value)  0.192  0.000  0.026  0.014  0.167  0.009  0.880  0.717  0.551  0.084  0.019  0.000  0.057 
No.  of  OBS  88 98 99  99 72 72 83 70  70 70  74  74  74 
No.  of  COUNTRIES  11 10 10  10 11 11 11 10  10 10  11  11  11 
Notes: PriceLevel97 is the relative price level in 1997. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. “House prices included” and “No house prices 
included” indicate whether or not house prices were included in the starting specification. REG1, REG2 and REG3 refer respectively to the narrow, intermediate and wide definitions of regulated 
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Table 12. Central and Easter Europe (CEE-10)Dependent variable: annual change in the HICP:  ) (X f P t =  
 
  1996-2005  1999-2005 
  Regulated prices excluded  Regulated prices included
  House prices included  House prices included 
  GMM GMM GMM  GMM  GMM 
   CONSTANT           
   INFLATION (-1)  0.137***  0.089***  -0.240***  0.084  0.157*** 
CYCLICAL FACTORS           
   OUTPUT GAP1 (-1)  0.356***         
   OUTPUT GAP2 (-1)    0.560***       
   ULC      0.776***  0.194****   
   GOV. SURPLUS/DEFICIT  -1.119***         
BALASSA-SAMUELSON EFFECT           
   B-S WIDE (CONST.)           
   B-S NARROW (CONST.)           
   PRODUCTIVITY DIFF.           
REGULATED PRICES         
   REG1        0.134**   
   REG2           
   REG3          0.212** 
OTHER STRUCTURAL FACTORS        
   SHARE OF RECREATION IN THE HICP           
   SHARE OF FOOD IN THE HICP           
   REAL FINAL HOUSHOLD CONSO           
   PRICE LEVEL 97 (CONST.)           
   GDP PER CAPITA           
EXTERNAL FACTORS         
   OIL PRICE           
   NEER  -0.611***  -0.706*** -0.471***     
   NEER (-1)       -0.111***  -0.129*** 
OTHER FACTORS         
   MONETARY AGGREGATES  0.919***  1.078***  0.543***  0.147***  0.191*** 
   HOUSE PRICES           
   VAT INCREASES           
   VAT DECREASES           
R2-adj 0.699  0.689  0.873  0.394  0.454 
Jarque-Bera normality test (p-value)  0.000  0.079  0.001  0.403  0.000 
No. of OBS  64  68  68  49  49 
No. of COUNTRIES  10  10  10  10  10 
 
Notes: See Table 11.   46
 
Table 13ac. Euro Area (excluding Luxembourg) + CEE-10 Dependent variable: annual change in the HICP:  ) (X f P t =  
 
 1996-2005 
  Regulated prices excluded 
  House prices included  House prices excluded
 GMM  OLS  GMM  GMM  OLS  GMM  GMM  GMM 
   CONSTANT    1.512***      1.520***       
   INFLATION (-1)  0.346*** 0.555***  0.420***  0.425***  0.498***  0.143***  0.077***  -0.029 
CYCLICAL  FACTORS            
   OUTPUT GAP1  0.301*** 0.136***        0.493***     
   OUTPUT GAP2      0.237***       0.189***   
   ULC        0.059***  0.087**      0.511*** 
   ULC (-1)        0.059***  0.087**      -0.024*** 
   GOV. SURPLUS/DEFICIT              -0.347***   
BALASSA-SAMUELSON  EFFECT            
   B-S WIDE (CONST.)                 
   B-S NARROW (CONST.)                 
   PRODUCTIVITY DIFF.                 
REGULATED PRICES            
   REG1                 
   REG2                 
   REG3                 
OTHER STRUCTURAL FACTORS           
   SHARE OF RECREATION IN THE HICP                 
   SHARE OF FOOD IN THE HICP                 
   REAL FINAL HOUSHOLD CONSO                 
   PRICE LEVEL 97 (CONST.)    -0.795**      -0.768*       
   GDP PER CAPITA                 
EXTERNAL FACTORS            
   OIL PRICE (-1)  0.010*** 0.011***  0.008***  0.010***    0.012**  0.018***  0.003*** 
   NEER       -0.071*** -0.077***  -0.0598*** -0.0633***   
   NEER (-1)  -0.073*  -0.113*** -0.142*** -0.128*** -0.111*** -0.226***  -0.177***   
OTHER FACTORS            
   MONETARY AGGREGATES              0.922***   
   HOUSE PRICES  0.026*** 0.021***  0.016***  0.033***  0.019**       
   VAT INCREASES                 
   VAT DECREASES                 
R2-adj  0.424 0.796 0.501 0.391 0.814  0.594  0.587  0.521 
Jarque-Bera normality test (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.022  0.000  0.000  0.001 
No. of OBS  150  150  150  119  150  152  152  151 
No. of COUNTRIES  17  17  17  17  17  21  21  21 
Notes: See Table 11.   47
Table 13b. Euro Area (excluding Luxembourg) + CEE-10 Dependent variable: annual change in the HICP:  ) (X f P t =  
 
 1999-2005 
  Regulated prices excluded 
  House prices included  House prices excluded 
  GMM  GMM  GMM  OLS OLS OLS OLS  GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM  OLS OLS 
   CONSTANT        0.781***  0.817***  0.843***  0.796***          2.134***  1.896***
   INFLATION (-1)  0.200***  0.276*** 0.255*** 0.301***  0.302***  0.319***  0.320***  0.306***  0.307***  0.228*** 0.198*** 0.242***  0.244***
CYCLICAL  FACTORS                 
   OUTPUT GAP1  0.394****     0.195***  0.176***      0.321***  0.271***      0.182**   
   OUTPUT GAP2    0.367*** 0.296***     0.180***  0.201***      0.322*** 0.284***   0.164***
   ULC                           
   GOV. SURPLUS/DEFICIT                -0.106*** -0.064***        
BALASSA-SAMUELSON  EFFECT                 
   B-S WIDE (CONST.)          -0.257**  -0.283***              
   B-S NARROW (CONST.)        -0.328**      -0.351***             
   PRODUCTIVITY DIFF.                           
REGULATED PRICES                 
   REG1  0.351***  0.397***   0.268***  0.266**  0.273***  0.276***  0.223***  0.269***  0.182*** 0.187*** 0.221***  0.229***
      R E G 2                  
      REG3     0.310***            
OTHER STRUCTURAL FACTORS                 
   SHARE OF RECREATION IN THE HICP                           
   SHARE OF FOOD IN THE HICP  -0.016*    -0.034**                     
   REAL FINAL HOUSHOLD CONSO                           
   PRICE LEVEL 97 (CONST.)                        -1.199**  -0.922* 
   GDP PER CAPITA                0.042***    0.021***      
EXTERNAL FACTORS                 
   OIL PRICE (-1)    0.009***   0.009***  0.009***        0.006***  0.008*** 0.006*** 0.009**  0.009** 
   NEER                 -0.129**    -0.206** 
   NEER (-1)        -0.113*** -0.116***       -0.153***     -0.205***  
OTHER FACTORS                 
   MONETARY AGGREGATES                           
   HOUSE PRICES  0.007***  0.007*** 0.022**  0.017**  0.018**  0.014**  0.013**             
   VAT INCREASES                           
   VAT DECREASES                           
R2-adj  0.271 0.380 0.091 0.778 0.778 0.775 0.774 0.411 0.545 0.201 0.268 0.765 0.641 
Jarque-Bera normality test (p-value)  0.014  0.116  0.000  0.747  0.717  0.787  0.854  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.038 
No.  of  OBS  91  93 91 107 107 107 107 119 119 123  123 134 134 
No.  of  COUNTRIES  17 17  17 17 17 17 17 21 21 21  21 21 21 
 
Notes: See Table 11.   48
10. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we sought to provide an overview of the factors, which may play a role in the 
determination of the price level and which may drive the inflation rate. We demonstrated that the price 
level of transition economies and less developed old EU countries is lower than in core euro area 
countries. This observation is attributable to the lower price level of virtually all goods and services. 
Regarding possible structural factors driving price levels and inflation developments, we found that 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect had a limited role to play in the transition economies despite large 
productivity gains in the tradable sector because of the incomplete pass-through form productivity to 
inflation rates due to a.) large productivity gains in some countries’ nontradable sector, b.) the low 
share of (market) services in the inflation basket and c.) an unequal distribution of productivity gains 
in the tradable sector ensuing a disconnect between productivity gains and wages, unequal wage 
equalisation across sectors. At the same time, price level convergence could occur thanks to changes in 
tradable and non-market non-tradable goods prices. Most importantly, advances in real convergence 
could lead to a shift in consumption patterns of households. Richer households tend to consume higher 
quality goods (quality effect), less energy and foodstuff and more services (composition and demand-
side effect). In addition, higher wages could (but need not) increase the price of domestically produced 
and consumed goods and the prices of all goods and services via more expensive wholesaling and 
retailing. Yet, wage increases were often largely offset by substantial productivity gains in the 
distribution sector of the transition economies. 
We pointed out that differences in economic structures could imply different inflation rates. And 
economic structures of transition economies may still be different to that of euro area countries in spite 
of the profound economic structure of the last 15 years or so. First of all, transition economies are 
more sensitive to oil price developments because they have more oil intensive production and they 
rely more on external oil resources than euro area countries. Second, business cycle synchronisation is 
helpful to diminish inflation differentials across countries. This could be ensured by trade linkages in 
general and via intraindustry trade in particular. While the share of intraindustry trade is fairly high in 
some transition economies, this is not the case for others. 
We argued that price level convergence should not necessary show up in inflation rates and that higher 
inflation rates do not automatically imply price level convergence. For instance, a lower exchange rate 
pass-through yields stronger price level adjustments but lower inflation rates. Also, different weights 
in the HICP due to differences in economic development could imply differing inflation rates but 
universal effects on the price level. Furthermore, changes in quality increases the price level but those 
changes should be eliminated from inflation rates. Finally, house price developments directly affect 
the actual price level and have no effect on the price level measured statistically, whereas their impact 
on the inflation is limited to rents. 
Besides a detailed overview of the factors driving price level convergence and inflation rates and a 
descriptive illustration of the main arguments, the second objective of this paper was to provide some 
qualitative evidence regarding the relative importance of the different (structural, cyclical and 
external) sources of inflation rates. Our first observation is that some factors are just less important for 
transition economies than for old EU members. Based on a simple accounting framework, we showed 
for instance that notwithstanding larger adjustments in the relative price of services compared to that 
of goods, service price inflation accounted for only half as much of HICP inflation in transition 
economies than in euro area countries in the period 1996 to 2005. All the same, rents play a much 
bigger role in inflation developments in the euro area than in transition economies where their 
contribution to overall inflation is almost zero. Second, goods and regulated services turn out to be 
equally important in both country groups. Finally, the relative price of energy increased more in 
transition economies than in the euro area, and because of their higher weight in the inflation rate, they 
also contributed more to inflation developments in the first group of countries. Similarly, the 
importance of foodstuff is considerably larger in transition economies than in the euro area. Finally,  
Some of these results are confirmed by our panel estimations. In particular, inflation rates do not 
appear to be influenced by the Balassa-Samuelson effect, irrespective of the alternative measures used, 
and little sign is found of inflation being driven by other structural factors in the euro area and in the 
transition economies. Nevertheless, once these two country groups are pooled together, initially   49
different price levels and progress in real convergence, captured by changes in the composition of the 
HICP and the growth rate of GDP per capita tend to lead to higher inflation rates. This indicates that 
although the Balassa-Samuelson effect has little importance in practice, other structural factors 
affecting both tradable and non-tradable goods are at work in low price level and high growth 
countries such as the transition economies. These factors relate to a.) the shift towards higher quality 
goods, b.) the composition effect, c.) the demand effect for non-tradables, d.) the nontradable 
component effect and e.) the role of the distribution sector. Unfortunately, our results do not permit a 
precise decomposition to pin down the relative importance of these factors. 
Second, inflation persistence, cyclical effects and regulated prices are particularly important 
determinants of inflation rates both in the euro area and in transition economies.  
Third, house prices and oil prices are found to exert a significant (but quantitatively small) positive 
influence on inflation rates in the euro area whereas they do not matter in transition economies. What 
really is important in transition economies is the exchange rate, although the relationship between 
exchange rate and inflation appears to have been weakened over time. 
Finally, we find little evidence that public finances are of relevance for inflation developments or that 
VAT increases or decrease matter a lot in both country groups.   50
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APPENDIX 1. Productivity Growth Rates: Methodological and 
Data Issues 
 
The Eurostat NewCronos database is the main source of the data to compute average productivity 
figures. NewCronos provides a 6-sectoral and a 17-sectoral decomposition of gross value added at 
constant prices, and employment data.
41 If needed, we complement this dataset with the European 
Commission’s AMECO dataset and, with the annual database of the Vienna Institute for Comparative 
Economic Studies (WIIW) for the transition economies. 
This enables us to compute productivity growth rates for the same sector using data drawn from 
different databases. The results are sometimes very astonishing or even disturbing. Surprisingly 
enough, the 6-sector and the 17-sector decomposition Eurostat data do not yield the same productivity 
growth rates for a number of cases, mainly because of differences in the employment data. For the 
Czech Republic, there is a fall of more than 30 percent in employment in 2005 as compared to 2004 
for the financial services, real estate and renting sector when using the 6-sector decomposition but 
there is no such drop when the 17-sectoral decomposition is used. The consequence is that 
productivity growth is 5 percent per annum in the first case while it is only the half of that in the 
second case. The implications of these differences are very different figures for dual productivity 
growth (see Table 3). A less brutal but still significant difference can be observed for Denmark. The 
comparison of data computed on the basis of NewCronos and AMECO also yields differences for the 
productivity growth rate in the manufacturing sector. Finally, another staggering gap opens between 
Eurostat data and data provided by the WIIW. While yearly productivity growth is above 8 percent for 
Slovenia when using Eurostat data, it moderates to below 4 percent on the basis of the WIIW data.  
The AMECO database provides us with four types of employment data: a.) the number of employed 
persons, b.) the number of full-time equivalent employed persons, c.) the number of employees, and 
d.) the number of full-time equivalent employees.
42 The use of different employment data matters in 
some cases. These figures are reported in Table 3 if the impact on dual productivity is larger than 0.5 
percentage points.  
A final note concerns a handful of countries, namely Austria, Greece, Portugal, the UK and Romania, 
for which either sectoral value added or employment data were not available from NewCronos. For 
these countries, productivity growth could be calculated using AMECO data only for total services, 
including public administration, and not for market-based services. This probably puts an upward bias 
on dual productivity given the very low growth rates in public services. 
                                                 
41 The 17 sectors are: 1) agriculture, hunting and forestry, 2) fishing, 3) mining & quarrying, 4) manufacturing, 5) electricity, 
gas and water supply, 6) construction, 7.) wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods, 8) hotels and restaurants, 9) transport storage and communication, 10) financial intermediation, 11) real 
estate, renting and business activities, 12) public administration and defence, compulsory social security, 13) education, 14) 
health and social work, 15) other community and social personal service activities, and 16) activities of households. The 6-
sectoral decomposition has the following sectors: a.) agriculture (1+2), b.) industry (3+4+5), c.) construction (6), d.) services 
1 (7+8+9), e) financial services (10+11), f.) public services (12+13+14+15+16). The employment data refer to 1000 of 
employed persons in the sector. 
42 Data on full time equivalent employment and employees is available for Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, 
Hungary, the Netherlands and Spain. By contrast, only data on the number of employed persons but not on that of employees 
could be obtained for Cyprus.   54
 
Table A1. The Distribution of Hypermarkets and Discounters in Europe, 2006 
  BE    DE    FR    NL AT GR    ES   PT IE IT    LU FI DK SE UK SI SK PL  HU EE    CZ   LV LT BG HR RO 
Hypermarkets 
TESCO                 92           X    20  80 58    30       
METRO  (Makro)  9  60  80 16 12  7 34  10    47      4    33    5 23 13    12      7  5 23 
CORA  7    59            2              7           1 
AUCHAN      116      46  17    43  1            19  10           
CARREFOUR  56   217     20 144  7   52               32               5 
CARREFOUR  (C&C)  106          16                        
LECLERC      340       7 12   17           1   14                
GEANT      113                       18            
EROSKI      3      79                              
W A L   M A R T   5 1                     X                  
SAINSBURY'S                      X                 
AHOLD                          23  14     53       
S E L V E R                                 4          
E T K                                 3          
RIMI  BALTIC                                    4   12  7       
NORFA                                    8     
Discounters 
ALDI  X X    X  370    X  X    X    X    X  40   X          
LIDL  X  X  X  X X  X  X  X X X  X X  X  X X  X X X  X    X        X   
Penny  Market  (REWE  Group)  2400 X    244         339*             51  35 137   201     9   17 
Zielpunkt         310                                
EDEKA    10834     823                                
VP  MARKET                              26   100  49  10    8 
Note: Data collected from publicly available sources, chiefly from the websites of the firms under consideration. 
 
 
Table A2. Average Labour Productivity Growth, euro area, 1995-2004 
  Euro  a.  BE DE FR NL FI  IT ES PT SE DK 
  1995-2004 1995-2004 1995-2003 1995-2004 1995-2004 1995-2004 1995-2004 1995-2003 1995-2002 1995-2003 1995-2004
Total  2.3 3.3 2.8 1.8 3.2 7.7 0.2 0.6 2.5 7.5 1.4 
food  0.3 1.1 -1.0  -1.3 2.1 7.3 0.4 1.0 5.1 1.7 1.4 
textile  0.7 6.6 3.8 4.0 7.3 1.3 0.2 1.6 1.0 2.9 4.5 
leather  -1.2 3.1 2.2 0.3 6.4 2.7 -1.6 0.7 -2.2 4.8 -6.6 
wood  2.7 6.6 3.1 7.0 1.9 5.2 2.9 0.7 3.6 7.5 1.2 
paper  2.8 3.4 1.4 0.4 4.5 4.3 1.5 0.7 -2.1 4.0 0.8 
rafinery  6.5  -2.6 -1.8  1.5  -0.9 25.8 -4.0  2.4 -57.5 6.0 -46.1 
chemistry 4.6 2.9 4.9 1.0 6.2 3.0 0.3 0.2 4.3 9.9 3.1 
plastic  1.8 4.7 1.9 3.1 1.8 0.8 0.0 1.7 3.2 3.0 -2.0 
other  nonmet  1.1 0.8 2.3 2.0 1.9 3.1 -0.4 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.9 
metallurgy  1.4 2.8 2.4 1.7 1.9 2.2 0.1 -0.8  -3.5 0.9 0.7 
machinery  1.2 4.5 0.6 4.3 2.1 2.5 -0.7 1.8 -4.6 2.1 -1.1 
electronics  6.0 7.3 7.7 4.1 2.2  30.9  -0.8 0.2  16.4  56.0  6.2 
transp  eq 1.9 4.5 1.6 1.9 7.5 0.2 1.2 0.1  26.6  6.0 -1.6 
other  manuf  0.8 5.2 0.4 -0.9 1.0 2.3 0.7 -1.3  -3.7 3.9 1.9 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the NewCronos/Euostat. 
 
 
Table A3. Average Labour Productivity Growth, CEECs, 1995-2004 
  CZ  CZ -2  HU  HU -2  PL  SK  SI  SI -2  BG  HR  RO 
  1996-2004 1995-2004 1996-2004 1995-2003 1996-2004 1996-2004 1996-2004 1995-2004 1998-2004 1998-2004 1996-2004
Total  7.2 5.7  10.5  7.7  10.0  8.3 3.4 9.2 7.5 5.5 5.2 
food  3.6 2.1 2.9 -2.9 6.0 4.6 1.8 -0.5 4.8 3.7 7.9 
textile  5.0 6.0 6.6 2.0 8.7 0.5 1.2 5.3 4.9 -0.1 4.7 
leather  -4.0 2.9 0.9 -4.1 6.3 8.4 -4.6 4.2 5.1 2.5 1.3 
wood  8.4 5.8 5.5 2.6 8.3 5.1 -1.8 5.3  13.1  3.1 5.2 
paper  6.3 7.4 6.6  10.4  7.6  10.2  -0.7 7.0 2.3 9.6 0.7 
rafinery  8.7 -10.5 8.0  -7.2  3.1  7.3  0.0  na  11.6 5.1 10.5 
chemistry 6.9 1.7 4.7 -0.7 9.8 8.8 6.2  12.7  8.7 6.4 9.9 
plastic  7.3 22.3 5.8  8.9 10.1 5.6  0.9  6.1 10.1 5.6  5.4 
other  nonmet  7.4 8.7 6.5 2.6  11.0  5.6 4.6 7.9  11.6  8.5 9.1 
metallurgy  4.6 -0.5 7.2 3.3 9.5 3.4 2.2 8.7  18.7  6.7 7.2 
machinery  10.4 5.7  8.3 16.4  12.8  11.7 2.2 15.2  13.7  10.7 7.8 
electronics  18.3 15.8 23.1 44.5 13.9 10.1  7.9  13.5 15.0  0.7  7.9 
transp  eq  8.5  16.6 14.7 14.8 18.7 21.8  8.4  15.4 14.1  8.1  12.8 
other  manuf  8.2 0.3 6.2 0.3 9.1  15.1  3.4 7.1  17.2  7.4  11.8 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the WIIW annual database.  
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